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ABSTRACT
A Study of Potential Security and Safety Vulnerabilities in Cyber-Physical Systems
by
Ali Al-Hashimi, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2020
Major Professor: Ryan Gerdes, Ph.D.
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
The objective of this dissertation is to study the performance of two examples of Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) which operate in adversarial environments, wherein it is possible
to modify the operation of one or multiple functionalities of the CPS and induce harmful
impacts. In literature, such damaging actions are referred to as attacks. From a security
perspective, the study and research of potential attacks on CPSs means defining possible
vulnerabilities in the latter, that could be exploited by attackers, and suggesting counter-
measures to deter or lessen the impacts of such attacks.
First, we study the behavior of vehicular platoons (CPS example 1) and whether it is
possible to attack the sensors, with which each platooned vehicle is equipped, with False-
Data Injection (FDI), or for an attacker to control one of the vehicles in the platoon and
thereby generate sudden accelerating/decelerating movements. For the study concerned
with vehicular sensor attacks, we consider a string of vehicular platoons driving in one
direction. Several previous studies show that the automation system of the platooned
vehicles cannot handle attacks against its sensors and, as a consequence, will revert control
back to a human driver and effectively disband the platoon. Although such an action is
meant to reduce the attack impacts, one or more of the following non-attacked platoons
may induce unexpected behavior that, according to our results, lead to collisions. For that
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reason, we suggest two mitigation solutions to be engaged by the non-attacked platoons, the
goal being to eliminate, if possible, or at least reduce the number of collisions. One solution
is centralized and formulated using the Model Predictive Control (MPC) technique. The
other solution is decentralized, heuristic in nature and requires fewer computations when
compared to the first solution.
Next, we focus on FDI attacks against vehicular sensors. For this part, we will employ
the optimal control-based reachability analysis in order to determine which conditions allow
such attacks to induce collisions and at which relative speeds. We conducted the analysis
for FDI attacks against a single range or range-rate sensor, both of them (on one car),
and against two range or range-rate sensors, either on the same car or two different cars.
In all cases, the results showed the possibility of inducing collisions as a result of FDI
attacks and at high relative speeds. Finally, we study the behavior of a single vehicular
platoon, wherein the attacker is able to control one of the vehicles. A previous study
indicate that such an attack may cause accidents, suggesting a mitigation scheme based
on the sliding mode control technique. Although the suggested mitigation succeeded in
reducing the collisions significantly, the movement of the intact vehicles is still influenced
by the attacker-controlled vehicle. For this reason, we modify the suggested mitigation.
Our modification will eventually lead to disbanding the platoon and, hence, releasing the
non attacked vehicles from the control of the attacker.
The second direction of this dissertation is to study the behavior of Heating, Venti-
lating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems (CPS example 2), used in smart buildings
to regulate the indoor temperature, while suffering attacks on their temperature sensors.
First, we formulate an MPC-based controller to track a desired temperature in each zone of
the building. The formulated controller uses readings from temperature sensors, installed
at various sections of the building, in the decision-making process and generates the appro-
priate control commands, or the required amount of air flow rate to each zone. Then, to
deter potential attacks against the temperature sensors, such as manipulating their mea-
surements, we suggest two Moving Target Defense (MTD) technique based algorithms. An
vimportant factor that facilitates such attacks is the fact that the MPC controller is static
in nature and, thus, attackers can easily induce predictable impacts, such as misleading the
controller and, as a result, causing occupants’ discomfort. Therefore, our suggested algo-
rithms continuously select a subset of the installed sensors and feed their measurements to
the MPC controllers. Furthermore, an optimal observer is employed in order to estimate the
other temperatures of which sensors are not selected. As a result, the impacts of attacking
the HVAC system’s sensors are reduced.
(181 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
A Study of Potential Security and Safety Vulnerabilities in Cyber-Physical Systems
Ali Al-Hashimi
The work in this dissertation focuses on two examples of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS), integrations of communication and monitoring capabilities to control a physical
system, that operate in adversarial environments. That is to say, it is possible for indi-
viduals with malicious intent to gain access to various components of the CPS, disrupt
normal operation, and induce harmful impacts. Such a deliberate action will be referred
to as an attack. Therefore, some possible attacks against two CPSs will be studied in this
dissertation and, when possible, solutions to handle such attacks will also be suggested.
The first CPS of interest is vehicular platoons wherein it is possible for a number of
partially-automated vehicles to drive autonomously towards a certain destination with as
little human driver involvement as possible. Such technology will ultimately allow passen-
gers to focus on other tasks, such as reading or watching a movie, rather than on driving.
In this dissertation three possible attacks against such platoons are studied. The first is
called ”the disbanding attack” wherein the attacker is capable of disrupting one platoon
and also inducing collisions in another intact (non-attacked) platoon vehicles. To handle
such an attack, two solutions are suggested: The first solution is formulated using Model
Predictive Control (MPC) optimal technique, while the other uses a heuristic approach.
The second attack is False-Data Injection (FDI) against the platooning vehicular sensors
is analyzed using the reachability analysis. This analysis allows us to validate whether or
not it is possible for FDI attacks to drive a platoon towards accidents. Finally, mitigation
strategies are suggested to prevent an attacker-controlled vehicle, one which operates inside
a platoon and drives unpredictably, from causing collisions. These strategies are based on
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sliding mode control technique and once engaged in the intact vehicles , collisions are re-
duced and eventual control of those vehicles will be switched from auto to human to further
reduce the impacts of the attacker-controlled vehicle.
The second CPS of interest in this dissertation is Heating, Ventilating, and Air Condi-
tioning (HVAC) systems used in smart automated buildings to provide an acceptable indoor
environment in terms of thermal comfort and air quality for the occupants For these systems,
an MPC technique based controller is formulated in order to track a desired temperature
in each zone of the building. Some previous studies indicate the possibility of an attacker
to manipulate the measurements of temperature sensors, which are installed at different
sections of the building, and thereby cause them to read below or above the real measured
temperature. Given enough time, an attacker could monitor the system, understand how
it works, and decide which sensor(s) to target. Eventually, the attacker may be able to de-
ceive the controller, which uses the targeted sensor(s) readings and raises the temperature
of one or multiple zones to undesirable levels, thereby causing discomfort for occupants in
the building. In order to counter such attacks, Moving Target Defense (MTD) technique is
utilized in order to constantly change the sensors sets used by the MPC controllers and, as
a consequence, reduce the impacts of sensor attacks.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this dissertation is the analysis of the behavior of a Cyber-Physical System
(CPS) operating in an adversarial environment wherein it could be possible for a malicious
individual, which we will refer to henceforth as an attacker, to gain access to various com-
ponents of the CPS, disrupt their normal operation, and induce harmful impacts. Two
examples of CPSs will be studied in this dissertation. The first CPS studied is vehicular
platoons travelling on a highway. These are vulnerable to attacks against one of the automa-
tion system functionalities, such as local sensors, which can cause platoons to slow down
and stop, resulting in an inefficient use of the road and greater fuel consumption. In more
serious cases, such disruption may cause a number of the platooned vehicles to collide with
each other, potentially leading to the loss of lives. Second, Heating, Ventilating, and Air
Conditioning (HVAC) systems are studied, wherein the measurements of installed sensors
can be manipulated to feed incorrect data to the corresponding controllers, and as a result,
temperature of the controlled thermal zone will increase or decrease, thereby leading to loss
of thermal energy and discomfort among the building’s occupants.
In general, a CPS may be defined as an integration of sensing, communication, and
computation capabilities in order to monitor and control a physical process. Dependence
upon CPS applications is growing steadily in applications such as transportation, smart
buildings, energy and power grids, and manufacturing. Clearly, many, if not all, CPS
applications are safety-critical, and any failure in their operation could lead to permanent
damage to the physical process under control and/or the people depending on them. As a
result, security of CPS applications has been the topic of a number of studies and references
therein [1, 2, 3], including defining possible vulnerabilities in a specific CPS, that could be
exploited by an attacker, analyzing the consequences of potential attacks, and suggesting
countermeasures against attacks if possible.
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Fig. 1.1. Possible threats on cyber physical systems.
Fig. 1.1 shows possible vulnerabilities of a typical CPS that could be exploited in order
to disturb the normal operation of CPS and generate harmful impacts. We can see that
a physical process (plant) utilizes a controller to regulate, or track, a predefined reference
(operation) point. The controller receives the reference point and current measurements
from the sensors, processes this data according to the employed control technique, and
then generates control commands to the actuators. Each one of those components can be
compromised (attacked), resulting in different consequences for the CPS [3]. The impacts
of attacking the sensing functionality of vehicular platoons and HVAC systems will be
considered in this dissertation.
1.1 CPS1: Vehicular platoons
Vehicular platooning is an automation technology wherein a number of vehicles are
grouped together to follow each other closely and safely without human intervention. This
technology has been shown to provide a safe and comfortable experience that ultimately
allows passengers to focus on tasks other than driving [4, 5]. Platooning also enables
3vehicles to safely navigate at a closer distance than is possible with human-driven vehicles,
thereby improving traffic throughput and reducing congestion [6, 7]. Additionally, studies
have shown that platooning can help improve fuel consumption [8]. In general, a vehicular
platoon includes a leading vehicle (leader) responsible for following a specified trajectory
to the destination and setting the speed by which the whole platoon travels, and following
vehicles (followers) which share the same control strategy that describes how they react to
changes in the leader’s behavior (e.g. the leader accelerates or decelerates).
1.1.1 Control of vehicular platoons: a survey
The idea of organizing a number of vehicles in platoons was studied by a number of
research groups [9]. The platooning objective is to combine multiple vehicles and design
the proper controllers to regulate and maintain a desired separation and speed. A large
body of literature already exists addressing how to achieve that objective for homogeneous
platoons, in which every vehicle uses the same control law [10]. Moreover, various spacing
policies which define the desired separation are proposed in order to implement control laws
that regulate the relative spacing of either the front of vehicle (unidirectional control) or
both the front and rear of the vehicle (bidirectional control) [10]. This is achieved with
solely locally-sensed information [11] or the addition of (V2V) communication [12]. The
work of [13] proposes appropriate communication schemes to transmit messages between
adjacent vehicles and also suggests a protocol that helps with the process of combining two
platoons. Additionally, [14] shows that it is feasible to establish vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) communication in order to exchange vehicles’ information with road units designed
for that purpose.
Vehicular platooning is an example of CPS as implementing such a system requires
communication, computation, and sensing capabilities in order to maintain predefined inter-
vehicle separation and relative speed among the platooned vehicles. Adaptive Cruise Con-
trol (ACC) and Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) are the most well-known
longitudinal control strategies used to form and maintain platoons, by implementing the
selected spacing policy. ACC operation requires locally available information, specifically
4the range (relative spacing) and range-rate (relative speed) gathered from sensors available
to the vehicle (e.g., RADAR, LIDAR, or cameras), to generate the appropriate acceleration
commands needed to maintain a preset inter-vehicle separation and speed. CACC, on the
other hand, is an extension of ACC which incorporates vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communi-
cation, so that vehicles may exchange state information and intentions (e.g., alerting other
vehicles to changes in acceleration), and is thereby able to achieve smaller inter-vehicle
separations [10].
1.1.2 Security of vehicular platoons: a survey
Vehicular platoon security has been the focus of extensive research in literature. Many
of the presented attacks are either insider attacks, in which one or multiple vehicle in
the platoon are compromised to facilitate implementing the attack, or outsider attacks,
wherein certain automation system components/functionalities are targeted from outside
the platoon. In [15], the authors use CACC technique to form the platoon and then they
present a number of insider attacks that target the vehicles’ controllers and could disturb
the formation. One of these attacks, for example, induces collisions at high speeds by
exploiting the CACC structure through sending false information to the following vehicles.
The authors also suggest a detection scheme for such attacks, based on requiring each
platooned vehicle to model expected behavior of the preceding vehicles and compare that
behavior with observed behavior. Such a scheme could lead to detecting abnormalities.
Further insider attack work is presented in [16], wherein platooned vehicles use ACC with a
bidirectional control algorithm to form a platoon. The attacker is then able to control one
of the vehicles and modify its controller’s gains such that generated acceleration commands
modify the behavior of the attacked vehicle and induce instability in the entire platoon.
Automated vehicle operating with the presence of an insider attacker is also discussed in
[17]. In this work, the efficiency of the platoon is degraded when a malicious vehicle causes
the surrounding vehicles to increase energy consumption unnecessarily. This is achieved by
implementing an optimally calculated sequence of accelerating and decelerating commands
by the attacker controlled vehicle.
5In [18], the authors employ ACC and CACC control schemes to show that multiple
attacker vehicles can operate within the platoon, modify their controllers, and coordinate
their behavior in order to produce instability in a large traffic of automated vehicles. These
attacks were able to induce traffic jams, passengers’ discomfort, and an increased risk of
collisions.
The studies conducted in [19] and [20] present how it is possible to detect and miti-
gate insider attacks mounted against vehicular platoons. In the former study, the authors
consider an ACC with a bidirectional control-based platoon, wherein an attacker has the
same capabilities as is given in [16]. The authors propose a low-pass filter detection scheme
combined with a sliding-mode control based mitigation strategy in order to handle the at-
tacker controlled vehicle misbehavior and reduce the risk of accidents. In the latter study
[20], the authors consider a CACC with a unidirectional control-based platoon, wherein the
insider attacker can cause Denial-of-Service (DoS) by broadcasting legitimate messages at a
higher rate when compared to other platooned vehicles, in order to saturate the inter-vehicle
communication channels. Furthermore, the authors suggest a detection strategy based on
using a system node, or a low powered computer that does not need high computational
capabilities.
On the other hand, there are other works which investigate external attacks on ve-
hicular platoons wherein the target is local range and range-rate sensors or inter-vehicle-
communication channels. The authors of [13] attempt to gain an understanding of the
possible impacts of an outsider attack on a CACC-based platoon. In their study, a number
of attacks against inter-vehicle communication channels are defined, including a falsifica-
tion attack, wherein the attacker alters the contents of the broadcast messages used to
implement the CACC control law, a spoofing attack, wherein the attacker pretends to be
a vehicle in the platoon and sends inaccurate messages to other vehicles in the platoon,
and a replay attack, wherein the attacker receives a transmitted message at a certain time
and sends it back to its original destination at another time, thus creating a chance for
hazardous effects, as the message contains old information. Furthermore, this study also
6considers attacks against the vehicle hardware at the manufacturing level such as tamper-
ing with or installing a faulted sensor, which would lead to feeding incorrect information to
the controller. The simulation results presented in [13] show that platoon stability can be
affected, and as a result, the passenger safety may be compromised.
Another work which considers an external attack on a CACC-based vehicular platoon
is presented in [21]. In this study, a wireless inter-vehicle channel suffers a jamming attack,
wherein data transmission is severed between various vehicles in the platoon, launched from
a drone flying above. The considered jamming attacks aim to disturb the string stability
of the platoon, a characteristic which ensures that relative spacing errors attenuate along
the platoon. In their study, the authors defined the best location for launching a jamming
attack that would result in the highest spacing error propagation. Simulation results for
that study show that attacker success produces string instability for the platoon by jamming
communications between the lead and follower vehicles in the platoon.
The authors of [22] investigated the effects of attacking CACC based vehicular platoons
with jamming and false data injection attacks. For this study, they used three of the
CACC existing controllers to implement platoons. In order to generate the right commands,
the first controller used constant distance for its spacing policy, the second used states
estimation to predict the acceleration of the preceding vehicle if it were not received, and
the third controller used state, position and speed, and information of the preceding and
lead vehicles of the platoon. The reason for using three different controllers is to quantify
their performance in the presence of the aforementioned attacks. According to the results
presented in this study, all tested CACC controllers are unreliable when subjected to the
above attacks; however, there are differences in terms of how each controller is affected by
said attacks.
In [23], another study was conducted on a CACC-based vehicular platoon, wherein it
was possible to manipulate the measurements provided by local RADAR, a sensor which
measures the range-rate, and LIDAR, a sensor which measures the range, equipped on each
of the platooned vehicles. In addition, this work also considers a case wherein an attacker-
7controlled vehicle within the platoon reports false acceleration data to the following vehicle,
information which is needed for CACC operation of the following vehicle, through the inter-
vehicle communication. Although detection was not considered, the authors of this work
have proposed two mitigation schemes: the first relies on the physical properties of the
platoon, whereby newly-obtained data are compared with previously-obtained data and in
the case that a certain threshold is violated, an attack may be in progress. The second
scheme is based on building a behavioral model over time by using gathered data and then
comparing that model with observed behavior. According to the given simulation results,
the second scheme has shown better performance in terms of the detection rate of all the
mounted attacks.
1.2 CPS2: HVAC systems
A smart building is a general term used to describe any building or a structure that uti-
lizes an automation system to supervise and control important functionalities/subsystems,
such as security, fire and flood safety, lighting, heating, cooling, and ventilating of the build-
ing. Designing a smart building, or even upgrading an old building to a smart one, requires
installing sensors and actuators on the building’s subsystems, such as fire alarms, water
pumps, doors, and/or heating/cooling units. In addition, dedicated controllers are imple-
mented to collect and analyze data from sensors and generate the appropriate commands
to the actuators of each subsystem.
Smart buildings provide two major benefits: First, such buildings are characterized
by an efficient use of energy, since the subsystems’ controllers can provide optimal control,
rather simple (classical) on/off control. Second, such buildings increase the comfort level
of their occupants, which, in turn, may lead to more productivity within corporate offices.
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems are one of the control systems
implemented in smart buildings. Such systems can provide thermal comfort in residential or
commercial smart buildings, while at the same time consuming less energy. For the purpose
of designing an appropriate controller that achieves certain goals, detailed information about
the heat dynamics of the building under consideration is needed. Acquiring an accurate
8building model is helpful in the decision-making process of the controller, especially when
the control strategy is highly dependent on the model of the process under control.
1.2.1 Control of HVAC: a survey
Optimal control of an HVAC system usually involves formulating multi-variable com-
plex optimization problems. For that reason, most control algorithms employed for HVAC
systems are simply on/off controllers. However, optimal control algorithms were also sug-
gested for the HVAC system as such algorithms have shown the ability to reduce energy
consumption. The authors of [24, 25] have developed a thermal model with the purpose of
designing an optimal controller for an HVAC system within a building. In their model, the
building is divided into a number of thermal zones, each of which could consist of single or
multiple rooms, and within which, each zone is assumed to have sensors installed to mea-
sure the current temperatures. Then, the authors propose a hierarchical control algorithm
which consists of two levels. The high level receives the current measurements and desired
temperature, as set by occupants of each zone in the building. The high level uses LQR
control technique to solve an optimization problem aiming to minimize energy consump-
tion and improve the comfort level of the occupants. The outputs of the high level are the
optimally-required amounts of air mass flow for each zone. The low level is simply a number
of PID controllers for each zone, each of which implement air mass flow as calculated by
the LQR.
Model Predictive Control (MPC) is a promising control strategy capable of operating
a building’s HVAC system in an optimal way while also satisfying state and input con-
straints, such as room air temperature and air mass flow rate. In [26], the authors used a
grey-box approach to develop a nonlinear thermal model of a building. Then, the authors
estimated the model parameters and validated the resulting model using recorded historic
data (based on buildings on campus where the authors work). Next, the model was lin-
earized around an operating point and then descritized, for the purpose of MPC controller
design. The suggested MPC controller ensured the minimization of total energy (air mass
flow) consumption and utilized the linearized model for future prediction. Performance of
9the suggested MPC controller was compared with that of a simple on/off controller and the
results showed a reduction in the air mass flow rate (input) throughout the day. Due to
the weather conditions of the building considered, the designed MPC was intended only for
heating. Another work considered also used MPC to reduce energy consumption but in this
case, it was utilized for the purpose of chilling (cooling) a building with a linear thermal
model [27, 28].
1.2.2 Security of HVAC: a survey
The authors of [29] defined possible vulnerabilities in the automation systems that
employ HVAC technology. Such vulnerabilities include the attacker’s capability to gain
physical access either to the controllers, by guessing the correct password and shutting down
the whole system, or to the interconnection between the HVAC’s critical components, such
as actuators, and, as a result, generating negative impacts. To counter such vulnerabilities,
the authors suggested a neural network-based intrusion detection mechanism. Another
vulnerability in HVAC systems defined by the authors of [30] is inaccurate measurement
in the temperature or air flow rate sensors. By exploiting such vulnerability, the targeted
sensors could produce measurements that are either below (negative bias) or above (positive
bias) the real value of the measured quantities. Similarly, a wavelet neural work was also
suggested and trained in order to diagnose faulty sensor(s).
In [31], several threats against HVAC systems were defined, including manipulating the
set points, feeding a sensor either a constant false measurement or varying measurements
that still fit within the bounds of the sensor measurements, or sending harmful commands
to the actuators. In the same work, a system model-based detection method was also sug-
gested. Similar to the above mentioned works, in this chapter we will focus on potential
attacks against the temperature sensors of HVAC systems that result in incorrect measure-
ments. Furthermore, we also suggest countermeasures to reduce the impacts generated by
such attacks.
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1.3 Analysis of threats against CPSs
As mentioned earlier, a number of attacks have been defined as possible threats against
CPSs. One such attack is false-data injection. We will define this attack and discuss
related previous works that make mention of this particular strategy. Furthermore, we will
describe the reachability analysis utilized in this dissertation to quantify the impacts of the
aforementioned attack.
1.3.1 False-data injection attacks
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are carried out by an adversary with the capabil-
ity to access and manipulate measurements provided by one or a set of a CPS sensors and
consequently cause misbehavior in the decision-making process of the CPS, ultimately com-
promising the operation of the controller. Compared with DoS, FDI attacks are designed
carefully such that their detection becomes more difficult as data is still available from the
sensors, just the correct data. Furthermore, this false data is not determined randomly, as
this data is predetermined to achieve certain attack goals. FDI attacks have been analyzed
in literature with the goal of defining them for various examples of CPSs and also providing
the conditions and guarantees necessary for successful FDI attacks.
The authors of [32] studied the effects of FDI attacks on a subset of sensors equipped for
a linear system, a system assumed to have a state estimator. Their work assumes that the
attacker has a full knowledge of the system and controller dynamics. This study explains the
necessary and sufficient conditions by which the FDI attack cannot be easily detected. The
analysis conducted in [33] focuses on the FDI attacks against the state estimation process
in electrical power grids. In this work, the attacker was assumed aware of the configuration
of the attacked power grid, which made it possible to design two attack scenarios that easily
passed bad measurements detectors, as these are usually installed in power systems, and
thereby produce false state estimation that could destabilize the grid.
As mentioned earlier, a platooning CPS controller requires measurements from on-
board sensors for its operation. Existing work has demonstrated that most on-board sensors
in automated vehicles, such as LIDAR or cameras, are vulnerable to FDI attacks executed
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at a distance. For example, [34] presents external jamming and spoofing attacks that can be
carried out against ultrasonic sensors and cameras, and experimental results even showed
a possibility of malfunctioning a Tesla vehicle. Also, it was proven possible to falsify the
readings of a vehicle’s RADAR [35], LIDAR, and/or cameras [36], and, as a result, disrupt
the behavior of the automated vehicle. Therefore, we will formulate an FDI attack that
could be mounted against one of the vehicular sensors in order to show the possible harmful
impacts that could result.
1.3.2 Reachability analysis
Reachability analysis defines the reachable set of a dynamic system, or the set of all
system states that can be attained within a finite time. Considering the physical bounds
and performance constraints of system states and inputs, reachability analysis helps us
verify whether from a given initial point, a system can eventually reach a given final point.
For this purpose, reachability can be applied in real world applications where safety must
be determined, such as collision avoidance problems in airplanes [37] and vehicles [38], or
controller design for the platooning of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) [39, 40].
Various methods have been proposed for obtaining reachable sets for different classes of
systems. Some of these methods are based on ellipsoidal techniques [41, 42] which calculates
outer elliptical bounds around the reachable set of a linear system with physical bounds on
its input vector. This method has been applied in problems such as determining algorithms
for collision avoidance in UAVs [43], or determining new artificial physical bounds for a
system’s actuators (inputs), in order to restrict the states that can be reached and hence
limit the impacts of potential attacks on that system [44]. Other methods, generally known
as Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) reachability, are based on finding the solution of a Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman partial differential equation [37, 45]. HJ reachability has been used to solve
various problems, such as auto landing of an aircraft [46], the interaction of two air-crafts for
automated aerial refueling [47], and path planning for UAVs [48]. Finally, another method
suggested for determining the reachable set is based on optimal control theory, wherein
the final states’ points are included in the formulation of an optimization problem. This
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problem, in turn, calculates the appropriate control required to drive the system states
toward those final states, while also considering states and input constraints [49]. This
method has been applied in problems such as determining a safe landing area for a moon
lander [50] and suggesting an alternate trajectory for vehicles, in order to make tracking
possible and avoid collision with other vehicles [51].
1.4 Mitigation of attacks against CPSs: Moving Target Defense
Moving Target Defense (MTD) has been suggested as a countermeasure that aims to
decrease the attacker’s ability to influence the attacked CPS. The MTD mechanism utilizes
a switching structure in order to alter the behavior of the CPS in terms of its actuators or
sensors. As a result, the MTD mechanism is proactive in nature and could preemptively
guarantee that most attacks would fail to induce harmful impacts. Previous work has shown
that MTD has been employed in computer security [52]. For example, the authors of [53]
proposed an MTD algorithm to protect the privacy of Internet Protocol version 6 users.
Their algorithm repeatedly changed the addresses of both the sender and receiver, such that
the attacker was prevented from identifying the two communication hosts. Similarly, the
authors of [54] developed an MTD algorithm for mutating the IP address, thus creating a
high chance of unpredictability while maintaining the original configuration of the address.
MTD has also been used in the context of control theory. In [55], the authors imple-
mented an MTD mechanism by introducing additional states related to the original states
of the control system, each with time-varying dynamics. While the new states are known
to the control system operator, they remain hidden from the attacker, and because their
dynamics change constantly, the attacker cannot identify them, and hence, the attack influ-
ence is deterred. Also, the authors of [56] formulated a zeros-sum game theoretic framework
to aid with designing an MTD strategy for a vulnerable system. They also developed a feed-
back mechanism that would allow the system to monitor its states and decide whether to
add stochastic dynamics as a part of the suggested MTD, such that the attack surface of
the system would be decreased.
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1.5 Organization
In Chapter 2, similar to the security-related works discussed in Section 1.1.2, we present
a possible vulnerability in vehicular platoons and analyze its impacts on platoon safety.
However, ours is the first work that considers the effect that the presence of human control
in the platoon can produce. Specifically, we try to answer the following: ”What happens
if control of multiple vehicles transitions to humans, due to disruption of the automated
systems?” or ”What happens if a passenger assumes command of a vehicle after observing
irregular motion behavior, owing to an already mounted attack?”. Naturally, once a human
driver controls the vehicle, they will first apply brakes in an attempt to slow down the
vehicle [57]. While such an action is helpful in avoiding accidents, it may also generate
instability in the following non-attacked platoons and lead to collisions.
In Chapter 3, we are concerned with the safety of a vehicular platoon operating in
an adversarial setting where it is possible to target one, or more, of the platoon’s vehicle’s
sensors with an FDI attack. Particularly, we are interested in defining the set of final states
that the platoon can reach as a result of experiencing a manipulation in the measurements
obtained from one or more of the locally-equipped sensors. For that purpose, we will use
the optimal control-based reachability approach to determine the reachable (final) set of
states, since it allows us to include attacker’s capabilities, physical limits on the vehicle’s
acceleration and speed, and resolution and physical limits of the attacked sensor(s) in the
problem formulation as constraints. Furthermore, this approach requires a prior definition
of the final states of interest. For that reason, and because we are primarily concerned with
the safety of the platoon, we will focus on unsafe states, which can be translated collisions
between two or more vehicles in the platoon and at different speeds of impact. Regardless
of the type of equipped sensors, from this point on we will refer to the sensors measuring
relative distance and speed as range and range-rate sensors, respectively.
In Chapter 4, we utilize MPC technique to formulate an optimal controller that aims
to achieve an acceptable temperature tracking, of a desired set-point, in each zone of the
building. To develop such a controller, a model of the process under consideration (the
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smart building) is needed. For that purpose, we employ a thermal model which captures
heat storage and transfer between connected spaces of the building, as well as the influence
of outside temperature. On the other hand, we consider a possible threat against the HVAC
system by manipulating the measurements of the temperature sensors installed at various
sections of HVAC-equipped buildings. An important factor that facilitates such attacks
against temperature sensors is the fact that the MPC controller, which uses those sensors, is
static in nature and thus, attackers can easily induce predictable impacts. Therefore, in this
chapter we suggest MTD technique-based algorithms which aim to add unpredictability to
the system by constantly changing the sensor sets used by the MPC controllers and thereby
reduce the impacts of potential attacks.
In Chapter 5, we study the behavior of a single vehicular platoon where one of the
platooned vehicles is controlled by an attacker. The latter is able to modify the platoon-
ing controller of the seized vehicle and, hence, produce sudden accelerating/decelerating
movements that can lead to collisions within the platoon. A previous study suggested a
sliding mode controller which uses only local vehicular sensor information without the need
for inter-vehicle communications, to mitigate the impacts of the aforementioned attack.
The suggested controller is also assisted with decentralized attack detection. Simulation
results from that study demonstrate that collisions are eliminated, or significantly reduced
in certain cases. However, the same results also indicate that the intact vehicles concede
platooning and start following the attacker. For instance, the lead vehicle, even if not at-
tacked, will no longer follow the reference trajectory of its platooning goals, once it detects
an attack in the following vehicles. Therefore, we will modify the suggested mitigation con-
troller such that collisions are also reduced and the control of intact vehicles will eventually
switch from auto to human, thereby disbanding the platoon so the attacker can have no
more influence.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DISBANDING ATTACK: EXPLOITING HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP CONTROL IN
VEHICULAR PLATOONING
Due to advances in automated vehicle technology and inter-vehicle communication,
vehicular platoons have attracted a growing interest by academia and industry alike, as
they can produce safe driving, regularize traffic flow, and increase throughput. Research
has demonstrated, however, that when platoons are placed in an adversarial environment
they are vulnerable to a variety of attacks that could negatively impact traffic flow and pro-
duce collisions and/or injuries. In this chapter, we consider an attack that seeks to exploit
human-in-the-loop control of compromised vehicles that are part of a platoon. Specifically,
we demonstrate that should a human operator need to suddenly take control of a platooned
vehicle significant upstream effects, which threaten the safety of passengers in other vehi-
cles, may be induced. To counter this so-called disbanding attack, we present an optimal
centralized mitigation approach. Due to scalability, security, and privacy concerns such an
approach may not be practical in reality so we propose a decentralized mitigation algorithm
that reduces excessive speed changes and coordinates inter-platoon behaviors to minimize
the impact of the attack. Our algorithm is compared to the aforementioned optimal cen-
tralized approach and is shown to produce nearly equivalent results while requiring far
fewer resources. Experimental results on a hardware testbed show that our countermeasure
permits graceful speed reductions and can avoid collisions.
2.1 Introduction
Vehicular platooning is an automation technology wherein a number of vehicles are
grouped together to follow each other closely and safely. This technology has been shown
to provide a safe and comfortable experience that will ultimately allow passengers to focus
on tasks other than driving [1]. It also enables vehicles to safely navigate at a closer dis-
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tance than it is possible with human-driven vehicles, thereby improving traffic throughput
and reducing congestion [2], as well as helping to improve fuel consumption [3]. Vehicle
platooning is an example of a cyber-physical system (CPS), as it requires an integration
of computation, communication, and monitoring capabilities to control a physical process.
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) are the
most well-known control strategies used to form and maintain platoons. ACC operation
relies on locally-available information to generate appropriate acceleration commands in or-
der to maintain a preset inter-vehicle separation and speed (longitudinal control). CACC,
on the other hand, is an extension of ACC that employs vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communi-
cation, so that vehicles may exchange state information and intentions (e.g., alerting other
vehicles to changes in acceleration), and is able to achieve smaller inter-vehicle separations
[4].
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) have defined levels of vehicular automation. Based on their crite-
ria, vehicle manufacturers have been able to produce vehicles at level 2 capabilities, including
BMW, Ford, and General Motors, or level 3, such as Tesla [5]. In level 2, an automated
vehicle is able to generate both longitudinal (accelerating/decelerating) and lateral (steer-
ing) control commands. This level also requires the human to monitor the road and retain
readiness to assume control if needed. Level 3 provides more automated functionalities in
terms of generating control commands and monitoring the driving environment; however,
it also requires a human driver to be available to assume control [6]. Platooning without
human oversight, a level 4 technology, is not yet a reality due to a lack of robustness in V2V
communications, the cost and number of sensors required to monitor the environment, and
unresolved questions regarding unexpected maneuvers on the part of other vehicles on the
road [7]. As a result, the current platooning automation technology falls in the category
of level 2 or level 3, and human attention is still required in the platooned vehicles in case
humans need to take control.
Transition of control is defined as the process of switching control from the vehicle’s
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automation to a human driver for cases when the automated system cannot handle certain
situations; e.g., a vehicle emerging from a side road abruptly and merging onto a highway
without notice, oncoming traffic turning left to enter a side road and crossing an automated
vehicle’s path, a car parking on the road and partially blocking the roadway [5, 8], or a
technical failure in one or more components of the vehicle’s automation system [9]. Such
failures could stem from deliberate manipulation of the automated system components
such as sensors, actuators, or inter-vehicle communication [10]. A number of previous
studies analyzed human driver behaviors post transition of control and results have shown
that some drivers apply maximum deceleration to handle certain situations, e.g., avoiding
collision with preceding vehicles [11, 12]. These studies also determined the time required
to ensure a safe transition [8, 13].
A platooning CPS (typically) employs a distributed controller that uses information
from both local sensors and other vehicles, information obtained through inter-vehicle com-
munications or connections to external networks [14]. As a result, a platooning CPS has
a large attack surface upon which an attacker could induce disruptive and/or fatal be-
haviors [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Attacks mounted against a platooning CPS can lead to the
disruption of the steady-state operation (i.e., desired inter-vehicle separation and relative
speed) and thereby produce harmful effects, such as collisions or uncomfortable accelera-
tion/deceleration, which could, in turn, lead to further disruption, such as chronic traffic
jams. Also, attacks on platooned vehicles could induce a transition of control which might
disband (dissolve) the platoon, as the latter would no longer be automated nor in compliance
with platooning control laws. While the security of platooning CPS has been studied from
many perspectives, so far the exploitation of the human element has been left unexplored.
In this chapter, we examine, from an adversarial perspective, the after-effects of au-
tomated vehicles transitioning their control to humans. Particularly, we are interested in
analyzing the upstream effects of all vehicles in a platoon transitioning control to human
operators (a process we refer to as platoon disbanding) due to a system failure resulting
from an attack. Although disbanding may seem a sensible fail-safe solution to prevent
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attackers from achieving their objectives, we will show that transition of control can still
be leveraged to undermine the operation of surrounding vehicles, cause collisions, and/or
induce massive congestion. The main contributions of this chapter are:
• We study the effect of a ”disbanding attack” that involves transition of control of
multiple vehicles in a platoon. We illustrate the harmful impacts such an attack
can induce, especially in the case of causing upstream (non-attacked) platoons to
experience slowdowns and collisions.
• We define a disbanding attack by formulating it as an optimization problem wherein
the objective is to maximize the deviation in vehicle speeds as a proxy for slowdowns
and increased chances of colliding, by selecting both platoon(s) to be disbanded and
time(s) of disbanding.
• To mitigate the aftermath of such an attack, we formulate an optimal solution using
a Model Predictive Control (MPC) technique. However, as the optimal approach
is not scalable in practice, as it is centralized and information and communication
intensive, we also propose a heuristic algorithm to be used locally by vehicles of intact
(non-disbanded) platoons. Our findings indicate that our algorithm produces nearly
equivalent results in terms of reducing speed changes and avoiding accidents.
• We also demonstrate the validity of the above attack and the suggested heuristic
countermeasures using experiments on a hardware testbed consisting of a motion
capture system and small mobile robots acting as vehicles.
2.1.1 A motivating example
Let us consider a scenario wherein multiple vehicular platoons are traveling in the
same direction on a highway. Although they may not be heading to the same destination,
platoons still follow one another in order to reap platooning benefits of optimizing traffic
flow and reducing congestion. Consider that while the platoons operate at a steady-state, a
malicious party utilizes an existing external attack techniques [18, 20] in order to destabilize
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Fig. 2.1. a) Position profiles of the platoons shown in the legend. The lead platoon started
disbanding at t = 2 s. b) Inter-vehicle separation profiles of the platoons shown in the
legend. The lead platoon started disbanding at t = 2 s. c) Speed profiles of the platoons
shown in the legend. The lead platoon started disbanding at t = 2 s. d) Position profile
of the rear vehicle in the platoons formation, whose size is shown in the legend. e) Speed
profiles of the rear vehicles belonging to a twenty-platoon formation when multiple platoons
start disbanding at different time instances.
the formation. For example, the attacker might install units on the roadside that can jam
the sensors of multiple vehicles or modify sensor measurements so that the targeted vehicles
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start behaving irregularly [21]. At this point, either the automation system would suffer a
failure and inform the driver, perhaps via sounding an auditory alarm [11], or the attack
would be detected by either a mechanism designed for such a purpose or by a passenger
who observes erratic behavior in the vehicle’s motion. In any case, the driver must assume
control of the vehicle and apply the brakes [9]. As a result, the attacked platoon would be
effectively disbanded as the vehicles would no longer comply with platooning laws, and the
mounted attack would fail to achieve its goals. However, intact upstream platoons, which
were not the goal of the mounted external attack, would also exhibit unexpected behavior
as a result of disbanding, which would create, at minimum, discomfort for passengers, or,
at maximum, collision.
Fig. 2.1a shows the position profiles of selected platoons, out of 20, whose indices
are shown in the legend. Each platoon includes 10 vehicles. The lead platoon (red), which
constitutes 5% of the total number of vehicles, transitions its control after being attacked at t
= 2 s. We can see that the lead platoon begins disbanding when the inter-vehicle separations,
shown in Fig. 2.1b, are no longer 5 m (the desired separation) and the platoon manages
to avoid accidents. Also, Fig. 2.1c indicates that the vehicles of the disbanded platoon
initially slow down before speeding up. In response to the disbanding of the lead platoon,
we can see in Fig. 2.1c that the following (still automated) 19th intact platoon (blue) also
begins to slow down. In addition, Fig. 2.1b shows that the inter-vehicle separation of the
19th platoon is also affected as it decreases when slowing down happens, but not below 0,
and then starts increasing to above 10 m when speeding up occurs, eventually reaching 5
m after almost 1 minute.
The same effect induced in the 19th platoon will propagate throughout the remainder
of the following platoons. For example, the 15th platoon (yellow) began decelerating until
all vehicles completely stopped, as shown in Fig. 2.1c, for almost 30 seconds. Then the
platoon’s lead vehicle began accelerating, reaching a maximum speed of 36 m/s in order to
decrease the gap with respect to the preceding 16th platoon (not shown in plots), before
it eventually slowed down upon approach of the preceding platoon, after almost 2 minutes
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(these actions of accelerating/decelerating result from the response of adopted automation
control laws to the behavior of the preceding platoon). We can see the same behavior in Fig.
2.1b where the inter-vehicle separation of the 15th platoon decreased, increased, and then
settled at 5 m. The same pattern also shows on the 10th (green) and last (cyan) platoons, but
in these cases, longer times were needed to regain the inter-vehicle separations and speeds.
For this specific disbanding attack, 10 minutes were needed in order for all of the affected
platoons to re-establish (recover) the desired separations and speeds. Furthermore, Fig.
2.1d shows the absolute position of the last vehicle in the traffic stream for various platoons
with the lead platoon disbanded. We can see that as the number of platoons increases, the
vehicle stops for a longer time before resuming movement. Furthermore, the string of 20,
50, and 80 platoons needed 10, 25, and 43 minutes, respectively, to recover. In summary,
we can see in these plots that disbanding one platoon could cause the following platoons
to respond irregularly, such that they stop-and-go, which, in turn, creates discomfort for
passengers, not to mention traffic jams, inefficient use of the road, and greater fuel-wasting.
Alternatively, when aware of such effects, an attacker could then target more than
one platoon systematically and produce even worse impacts, such as multiple stop-and-go
behaviors, which inevitably lead to passenger discomfort, greater fuel wasting, and increased
collisions. For example, an attacker can induce disbanding by targeting every other platoon,
out of twenty, at regular intervals, with 30 s increments (Fig. 2.1e). For the speed profiles
shown in Fig. 2.1e, 65%, 45%, and 37.5% of the intact platoons were forced to stop-and-go
once, twice, and three times, respectively. As a result, 55% of the vehicles, in the intact
platoons, suffered collisions.
2.1.2 Related work
The objective of vehicular platooning is to combine multiple vehicles and design the
proper controllers to maintain a desired separation and speed [22]. A large amount of
literature addresses how to achieve that objective. Also, various spacing policies have been
proposed for implementing control laws that regulate the relative spacing, either in front of
the vehicle (unidirectional control), or on both the front and rear of the vehicle (bidirectional
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control) [4]. This is achieved by using either locally-sensed information or with the addition
of (V2V) communication [23]. Communication schemes have been proposed [24] to transmit
messages between adjacent vehicles. In addition, it has been found that establishing vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) communication is feasible in order to exchange vehicle information
with road units designed for that purpose [25]. In this work, we adopt a proportional-
derivative controller from [23] to form our platoons with the presence of a forward-looking
V2V communication in order to implement our suggested attack mitigation (Section 2.4).
Vehicular platoon security has been the focus of extensive research in literature. For
example, [17] presents a number of insider attacks that target vehicles’ CACC controllers.
It suggests detection schemes for those attacks. Another insider attack work is [16], wherein
the attacker’s controlled vehicle is able to modify its controller’s gains such that generated
commands induce instability in the entire platoon. [15] shows that it is possible for a
malicious vehicle in the platoon to increase energy consumption unnecessarily in neighboring
vehicles by misbehaving. In [19], it is shown that multiple attacker vehicles can operate
within the platoon and coordinate their behavior in order to produce instability that could
lead to accidents. Alternately, other works investigate external attacks wherein local range
and range-rate sensors are targeted to misinform the vehicle of the surrounding vehicles’
information in order to negatively impact road efficiency and passenger comfort and safety
[18, 20]. Similar to the security-related works above, we also present a possible vulnerability
in vehicular platoons and analyze its impacts on platoon safety. However, ours is the first
work that considers the effect the presence of human control in the platoon can produce.
Specifically, we try to answer ”what happens if control of multiple vehicles transition to
humans because of disruption of their automated systems?” or ”what happens if a passenger
decides to assume command of a vehicle after observing irregular behavior in its motion,
owing to an already mounted attack?”. Naturally, once a human driver starts controlling
the vehicle, brakes will be applied in an attempt to slow the vehicle [9]. While such an action
is helpful in avoiding accidents, it will also generate instability in the following non-attacked
platoons that could lead to collisions.
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1st Platoon 2nd Platoon Nth Platoon
intra-platoon separation inter-platoon separation
direction of travel
Fig. 2.2. A stream of n-vehicle N platoons. Green arrows represent the flow of transmitted
information.
2.1.3 Organization
Section 5.5 explains the vehicular platooning control laws and describes the threat
model. Section 2.3 discusses different optimal attack scenarios and analyze their impacts.
Section 2.4 presents effective attack countermeasures. Experimental results are presented
in Section 2.5. Conclusions are given in Section 2.6.
2.2 System Model
The modeling of platoon dynamics and control as well as the attack mechanism are
discussed in this section.
2.2.1 Vehicle and platoon model
We consider N homogeneous platoons, where every vehicle uses the same control law,
with n vehicles in each (lead vehicle is indexed as n while the last vehicle is indexed as 1)
as shown in Fig. 2.2. Each vehicle is equipped with front and back range and range-rate
sensors, to measure the corresponding relative distances and speeds, and implements an
upper-level controller (responsible for determining the commanded (desired) acceleration)
and a lower-level controller (uses the desired acceleration to determine throttle and brakes
commands). The latter is expected to achieve the desired acceleration with some delay
due to its finite bandwidth [4, 14]. We will focus on the upper-level controller since the
attacker can easily affect it (e.g., through attacks on sensors). The following model is used
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to simulate the dynamics of each jth vehicle in the ith platoon

x˙i,j(t)
v˙i,j(t)
a˙i,j(t)
 =

0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 −1τ


xi,j(t)
vi,j(t)
ai,j(t)
+

0
0
1
τ
ui,j(t) (2.1)
where x, v a, and u refer to the vehicle’s absolute position, velocity, acceleration, and
commanded acceleration, respectively, and τ is a time constant used to model the actuator’s
delay. In this work, vehicles in a platoon use a bidirectional control technique [23] which has
two major benefits: First, it is able to guarantee platoon string stability, which maintains
proper traffic flow [4, 23]. Second, it does not need any (V2V) transmitted information to
generate control commands. However, such a wireless communication is established and will
be used to inform vehicles of attack detection and to transmit data in the mitigation process
(Section 2.4) though at a data rate far lower than that required to maintain V2V-enabled
platoons. For the last vehicle in the ith platoon, we have
ui,1(t) = kp
(
xi,2(t)− xi,1(t)− xd
)
+ kd
(
vi,2(t)− vi,1(t)
)
(2.2)
where kp and kd are the controller’s proportional and derivative gains, respectively, and
xd is a constant denoting inter-vehicle desired separation. For the other vehicles in the i
th
platoon, except the leader, we have
ui,j(t) = kp
{(
xi,j+1(t)− xi,j(t)− xd
)− (xi,j(t)− xi,j−1(t)− xd)}
+ kd
{(
vi,j+1(t)− vi,j(t)
)− (vi,j(t)− vi,j−1(t))} (2.3)
A different control structure is adopted for the platoons’ lead vehicles since we expect that
the platoon may encounter other platoons as they travel on the road. Lead vehicles attempt
to maintain a desired separation and speed, with respect to a preceding vehicle, by using a
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control law given by [4]
ui,n(t) = kp
(
xi+1,1(t)− xi,n(t)− h.vi,n(t)
)
+ kd
(
vi+1,1(t)− vi,n(t)
)
(2.4)
where h is a time headway constant. Also, each lead vehicle is equipped with a transitional
controller which is engaged in cases it encounters a slowly moving vehicle or a slowly driving
platoon on the road. Interested readers are referred to [4] for more details on transitional
controllers. W are interested in studying the effect of control transition. Therefore, we will
adopt the Intelligent Driver Model (IDM) [26], which can predict human driving behavior,
to simulate the dynamics of control transitioned vehicle(s). The commanded acceleration
of the disbanded platoon vehicles is calculated using
ui,j(t) = umax
{
1− (vi,j(t)/vd)4 − (s∗(t)/(xi,j+1(t)− xi,j(t)))2}
s∗(t) = r0 + vi,j(t)
{
h+ (vi,j(t)− vi,j+1(t)/(2√uminumax)
} (2.5)
where vd is the desired velocity, umin, umax are minimum and maximum acceleration, re-
spectively, and r0 is the minimum inter-vehicle separation (a vehicle cannot move if the
separation is smaller than r0). Finally, we assume that all vehicles are equipped with a
collision-avoidance technique where umin will be applied when the following condition is
true [4, 24]
xi,j+1(t)− xi,j(t) ≤ r0 +
(
v2i,j(t)− v2i,j+1(t)
)
/2umin (2.6)
2.2.2 Threat model
The aim of a disbanding attack in a multi-platoon scenario is to cause harm to the
vehicles in some of the platoons by targeting one or more vehicle(s) in a different platoon and
disrupting their automation. More specifically, this type of attacks relies on compromising
some aspect of a vehicle’s automation system so as to force the vehicle to abandon automated
operation, i.e., transition of control, and hence cause the platoon to which it belongs to
disband. The action of disbanding will then impact upstream platoons. As stated earlier,
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the level of automation provided by the currently available automation technology is still
not highly autonomous. Therefore, it is still expected that human drivers will need to take
control of the automated vehicles during certain situations.
One possible attack vector that could be leveraged to compromise a vehicle’s automa-
tion, and force a transition of control, is to target the vehicle’s front and/or rear facing
sensors, those that are relied upon to perceive the relative distance and speed of neighboring
vehicles. Existing work has demonstrated that LIDAR, RADAR, camera, and ultra-sonic
sensors, the most commonly-used sensors in automated vehicles for these purposes, can be
jammed or spoofed and that such attacks can be targeted, easy to carryout, accomplished
at a distance, and mounted against multiple vehicles at once [21, 27, 28, 29].
To demonstrate the impacts of the disbanding attack in our study, we assume the
attacker has the capability to target the sensors of either one or multiple automated vehicles
belonging to one or more platoons. Also, we assume that the mounted attack succeeds
in degrading the sensing functionality of the automation system(s) employing the targeted
sensor(s). We consider two possible scenarios resulting from this attack. In the case wherein
a sensor of a single vehicle in a platoon is targeted and its automation compromised, the
vehicle will utilize V2V communications and alert the other vehicles in that platoon so
that they begin to transition their control1. In the case of targeting the sensor(s) of all
vehicles in a platoon, the automation systems of those vehicles will suffer the disruption of
the sensors operation, become unable to handle the current situation, and begin the process
of transition of control. In either case, the automated vehicles are forced to transition their
control in an attempt to mitigate the attack and avoid accidents, effectively disbanding the
platoon.
Although the process of disbanding a platoon can help with avoiding accidents, the
resulting action of braking will cause upstream effects on intact (non-attacked) platoons.
Those effects pose a threat to the safety of these platoons, resulting in sudden and excessive
velocity changes that could lead to collisions. Disbanding attacks are extremely effective,
1Disbanding (dissolving) a platoon when one vehicle reverts to manual control has been recommended
in actual platooning systems [30].
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as attack-resilient platooning controllers tend to ignore human intervention in the design
process.
2.3 Human-in-the-loop Attacks
In this section, the disbanding attack is formulated as an optimization problem in order
to find an optimal attack scenario. Then, the simulation setup to carry out such an attack
is explained.
2.3.1 Finding an optimal disbanding attack
Given the attacker’s capabilities and platoon dynamics as described in Section 2, the
goal of the attacker is to find which platoon(s) and at which time(s) vehicles’ sensors must
be attacked, to induce disbanding, such that the velocity deviation of all intact vehicles is
maximized. To assess the impacts of disbanding attacks on the simulated platoons, we use
the following metrics
• Average velocity error (deviation): which describes the non-attacked platoons’ slowing
down as a result of disbanding another platoon(s). For the jth vehicle in the ith
platoon, the average velocity error is defined as
Ev =
1
|Ts|
|Ts|∑
k=1
|vi,j(tk)− vd|
vd
∗ 100 (2.7)
where Ts is the attack window (in seconds), and vd is desired speed. Since we are
considering platoons, equation (2.7) is modified into the following
Ev =
1
N ∗ n ∗ |Ts|
N∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|Ts|∑
k=1
|vi,j(tk)− vd|
vd
∗ 100 (2.8)
which calculates Ev for all vehicles (N ∗ n) throughout Ts.
• Collisions: although each vehicle is assumed to be equipped with a collision-avoidance
algorithm, crashes between some of the intact vehicles can still occur according to
36
our simulations as a result of disbanding. Therefore, we will indicate whether the
considered attack scenario involves collisions or not.
Let pd be a vector of indices of platoons to be disbanded, and td a vector of times of
disbanding. The attacker will solve
maximize
pd,td
Ev = f(pd, td)
subject to 1 ≤ pd ≤ N
1 ≤ td ≤ Ts
pd(i1) 6= pd(i2) for i1, i2 = 1, . . . , no. of targeted platoons
(2.9)
Equation (2.9) is interpreted as follows: given a number of targeted platoon(s), the
attacker seeks the best values for pd and td such that the highest value for the cost func-
tion Ev will result. The constraints of the problem ensure that values of pd and td are
within bounds and the same platoon cannot be disbanded twice (in case of multi platoon
disbanding). We used the Genetic Algorithm (GA) Toolbox in MATLAB to solve equation
(2.9).
2.3.2 Simulation setup
For the theoretical results presented in this work, we used MATLAB to simulate a
string of platoons, using the control structures and dynamics from Section 2.2.1. Table
2.1 displays the data used in all subsequent simulations. In previous work, the value of
τ was selected to be either 0.1 s [31] or 0.5 s [4]. To generalize the problem, we also
simulated values in-between for (τ). To produce realistic simulations, all vehicles’ velocities
are ensured to be below or equal to a maximum value and all vehicles move only forward
(no negative velocities). Also, the acceleration is bounded within minimum and maximum
values. Since the vehicles’ responses to initial separations and velocities may result in some
overshoot before reaching the steady-state, all simulations were started at the steady-state
so that that transient response will not interfere with the attack impacts.
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2.3.3 Results
Two different cases of disbanding attacks are shown. In Fig. 2.3a, the attacker seeks
disband the lead platoon, and in Fig. 2.3b, the attacker seeks to disband the lead two
platoons, out of 10 total platoons. Results are shown in terms of the absolute speed of the
last/rear vehicles of intact platoons (legends are removed to reduce visual clutter). We can
see clearly that disbanding results in slowing down, hence deviating from the desired speed
of 31 m/s, and even stopping completely. That behavior is captured by calculating Ev using
(2.8) which is equal to 29.57% and 43.69% for Fig. 2.3a and 2.3b, respectively. For Fig.
2.3c and 2.3d, the total number of platoons (N) is varied between 2 and 10, as shown on
the x-axis, and the actuator’s delay (τ) is varied between 0.1 s to 0.5 s with an increment
of 0.1 s, and the time headway (h) is selected equal to 1.5 s.
For each value of N , the solution of (2.9) indicated that the optimal disbanding attack
always occurs by disbanding the lead platoon and at at time equal to 1 s (the beginning
of the attack window). Fig. 2.3c shows the optimal (maximum) average velocity error
(Ev) for disbanding the lead platoon and for different values of τ . We can see clearly
that more severe attack impacts are induced as the total number of platoon increases. We
have already assumed in Section 2.2.1 that all vehicles are equipped with an appropriate
Table 2.1. Parameters used in the simulations.
Parameter Value Description
N [2:10] number of platoons
n 10 number of vehicles per platoon
kp 1 controller’s proportional gain
kd 5 controller’s derivative gain
xd {5,4} m desired inter-vehicle separation
vd 31 m/s nominal velocity
h 1.5 s time headway
τ {0.1,0.3,0.5} s time-lag constant
vmax 36 m/s maximum velocity
vmin 0 m/s minimum velocity
umax 1 m/s
2 maximum acceleration
umin -5 m/s
2 minimum acceleration
r0 1 m minimum inter-vehicle separation
Ts 180 s simulation time
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Fig. 2.3. a) Speed profiles of platoons’ rear vehicles (N = 10) when the lead platoon started
disbanding at t = 2 s. b) Speed profiles of platoons’ rear vehicles (N = 10) when the 9th
and 10th platoons started disbanding at t = 2 s and 100 s, respectively. c) Average velocity
error for optimal single-platoon disbanding cases. d) Number of collided vehicles for optimal
single-platoon disbanding cases.
collision-avoidance algorithm. However, simulation results indicate that disbanding attacks
can also cause accidents between some of the vehicles in the intact platoons, those which
were not the original target of the attack. Fig. 2.3d shows the number of colliding vehicles
for each of the optimal disbanding attack cases, as displayed in Fig. 2.3c. We can see that
regardless of N , collisions occur when the actuator’s delay is greater than 0.1 s, and the
total number of accidents increases as the total number of platoons increases.
2.4 Attack mitigation
We propose two approaches each of which proactively adjusts the commanded accel-
eration profiles of intact platoons’ vehicles in an attempt to mitigate attack impacts, by
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lessening the velocity deviations and reducing the number of collisions if possible. By ex-
ecuting each of the proposed approaches, the automation of intact platoons is maintained
and no transition of control will be initiated.
2.4.1 Optimal mitigation
The mitigation of disbanding attacks impacts is formulated as an optimization control
problem. The Model-Predictive Control (MPC) technique is used to find an on-line solution
using receding horizon [32]. The MPC based formulation is an optimal control technique
that has been used successfully in different applications [33]. It is based on minimizing a cost
function (velocity deviation) in order to achieve a certain goal (mitigating disbanding attack
impacts), while considering performance and physical constraints (collision-avoidance and
speed and acceleration bounds). As such, this optimal approach will be used to compare
and evaluate the performance of the other approach, as suggested in Section 2.4.2. However,
this approach requires more computation power and more sophisticated infrastructure to
perform the required calculations.
Using this approach, the objective is to compute a control sequence which will command
each vehicle behind the disbanded platoon, in order to reduce the deviation in velocity and
avoid accidents. More specifically, the controller of an intact vehicle will use the current
measurements of velocity and acceleration in order to solve
min
U
2M1U + U
TM2U (2.10)
s.t. M3U ≤M4 (2.11)
where U is the resulting control sequence and M1, M2, M3, and M4 are matrices formu-
lated to consider acceleration and physical speed limits, as well as collision avoidance. The
complete formulation for this controller is given in Appendix A. While this approach would
yield an optimal solution for every time instance, it requires global knowledge of the platoon
dynamics. Namely, to perform the calculations needed to produce U , to command intact
vehicles, speed and acceleration measurements of all related vehicles should be available to
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a centralized infrastructure responsible for those calculations, basically a central computer
with (V2I) and (I2V), wherein the needed capabilities exist to receive current measurements,
perform the required calculations, and transmit the resulting acceleration commands back
to the corresponding vehicles. It has been shown that such a communication structure is
feasible [25], but not likely to be deployed in the near term, as it presents a single-point
of failure. For that reason, in the next section we suggest an efficient heuristic mitigation
approach which requires a less sophisticated communication model and produces nearly
equivalent results to the optimal approach.
2.4.2 Efficient heuristic mitigation
The goal of this approach is to modify the commanded acceleration of a vehicle by
comparing the distance it will cover with the distance that will be covered by the preceding
vehicle during a predefined time horizon (ts). Initially, the acceleration commands of both
vehicles are calculated according to the platooning control structures given in Section 2.2.1.
Let us consider a vehicle in an intact platoon (Vcurrent) and a preceding vehicle (Vpreceding),
where subscripts (current) and (preceding) refer to two adjacent vehicles belonging either
to the same platoon or to two different adjacent platoons. Each vehicle’s dynamics are
described by
x˙m(t) = vm(t),
v˙m(t) = um(t),
(2.12)
where m ∈ {current, preceding}, t ∈ [ts(1) : ∆ts : ts(end)], ts(1) and ts(end) are the first
and last time samples of the time horizon ts, and ∆ts is the time increment. Under the
assumption that um is constant for the duration of ts and using the forward difference
approximation [34], the absolute position and velocity can be calculated as follows
xm
(
ts(k + 1)
)
= xm
(
ts(k)
)
+ ∆tsvm
(
ts(k)
)
,
vm
(
ts(k + 1)
)
= vm
(
ts(k)
)
+ ∆tsum,
(2.13)
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Algorithm 1: Heuristic mitigation
Input: vm(ts(1)), um(ts(1)), for m ∈ {current, preceding} // velocity and
commanded acceleration values of current and preceding vehicles.
Output: unewcurrent, // new commanded acceleration value for current vehicle.
1 unewcurrent ← ucurrent(ts(1)) ;
2 compute dm for the interval of ts using input data;
3 if dpreceding < dcurrent then
4 unewcurrent ←
dpreceding−vpreceding
(
ts(end)−ts(1)
)
0.5
(
t2s(end)−t1s(1)
) ;
5 if current vehicle and preceding one will collide during ts then
6 search for unewcurrent within
[
amin, upreceding
)
;
where k = 1, . . . , |ts|. Once the vector xm(.) is obtained, the distance traveled by vehicle
(Vm) during ts can be calculated as dm = xm
(
ts(end)
)−xm(ts(1)). Based on the calculated
distance travelled by the current vehicle dcurrent and that of the preceding vehicle dpreceding,
we proceed as follows
• If (dpreceding < dcurrent), then (Vcurrent) is covering more distance and may collide
with a preceding vehicle. Therefore it has to slow down by modifying its commanded
acceleration (ucurrent). To produce the same traveled distance for Vcurrent, ucurrent is
selected equal to unew which is calculated as
unew =
dpreceding − vcurrent
(
ts(end)− ts(1)
)
0.5
(
t2s(end)− t2s(1)
) , (2.14)
Using the new acceleration command, another important consideration is to ensure
that the predicted position vectors of (Vcurrent) and (Vpreceding), calculated using
(2.13), will not overlap (collide) during the interval of ts. If that is the case, then accel-
eration need to be further modified and selected from the interval
[
amin : ∆a : unew
)
where ∆a is a suitable acceleration increment. Namely, ucurrent is set equal to the first
value smaller than unew within that interval. If the new value produces no collisions,
then it is applied. Otherwise, the next value is selected and so on.
• If (dpreceding ≥ dcurrent), then the commanded acceleration ucurrent, calculated accord-
ing to the platooning control laws from Section 2.2.1, is maintained.
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The steps of this approach are shown in Algorithm 1. Once the disbanding attack against
one of the platoons is detected, as explained in Section 2.2.2, the last vehicle of the disbanded
platoon will inform the following lead intact vehicle, using the established inter-vehicle
communication. The latter vehicle will calculate its platooning acceleration command and
modify it, if needed, using this mitigation approach. Furthermore, it will also inform the
following vehicle to implement similar steps. Practically, in order to implement the sug-
gested approach locally on a certain vehicle, the following information should be available:
the commanded acceleration of both the current vehicle (measured locally) and the pre-
ceding vehicle (transmitted via the already established communication), and the velocity
of both the current vehicle (measured locally) and the preceding vehicle (estimated form
the measurements of velocity and relative velocity). The process described above will be
repeated at the next time instant, using the newly-obtained measurements. Vcurrent will
reuse the adopted platooning control law once the inter-vehicle distance, with respect to
Vpreceding, begins to increase. Finally, it should be noted that our platooning model (Section
2.2.1) requires a far less sophisticated communication model to connect any two neighbor-
ing vehicles, performs a decentralized mitigation, and produces equivalent results to the
MPC-based mitigation. Hence, it is not only cheaper to implement the heuristic approach
rather than the MPC-based one, but the former is also more resilient.
Table 2.2. Results for optimal one-platoon disbanding attack
xd
[m]
τ
[s]
Ev [%] Crash
baseline mit.1 mit.2 baseline mit.1 mit.2
5
0.1 29.570 24.283 23.025 No No No
0.3 41.268 25.556 25.182 Yes No No
0.5 52.235 28.482 28.709 Yes Yes Yes
4
0.1 27.995 25.063 22.798 Yes No No
0.3 40.115 26.864 24.823 Yes No No
0.5 52.706 29.079 29.742 Yes Yes Yes
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2.4.3 Results and discussion
Table 2.2 displays the average velocity error Ev collected from different scenarios, in-
volving the optimal single-platoon disbanding attack. Baseline, mit.1, and mit.2 refer to
platoons using the control structure from Section 2.2.1, the heuristic mitigation, and the
MPC-based mitigation, respectively. For all cases given, the total number of platoons is
equal to 10, while the inter-vehicle separation xd and actuator’s delay τ parameters are
varied, in order to generate different scenarios.
We can see in Table 2.2 that the baseline control does not perform well against the
disbanding attack, since all cases involve accidents (except for xd = 5 m and τ = 0.1 s)
and an increase in Ev. On the other hand, it is clear that our approach improves the
values of Ev for all attack cases. In addition, collisions are avoided in most attack cases
except when τ equals to 0.5 s. Also, the heuristic approach reduces the number of colliding
vehicles. For example, the attack case with xd = 4 m resulted in accidents involving 58%
and 29% of the total number of vehicles (100) for the baseline and mit.1, respectively.
Furthermore, the attack case with (xd = 5 m, τ = 0.1 s), which had no accidents, 80%
of the intact vehicles experienced stop-and-go once, due to the use of a collision-avoidance
algorithm that functioned by applying maximum deceleration. However, in our approach,
and for all attack cases, all intact vehicles slowed down gradually and did not have to come
to a complete stop. Using mit.2 also helps with improving the values of Ev and avoiding
collisions. By comparison, we can see that the values of Ev for both mit.1 and mit.2 are
very equal. In fact, it is clear that our approach improves the results, in terms of lowering
Table 2.3. Results for optimal two-platoon disbanding attack
xd
[m]
τ
[s]
Ev [%] Crash
baseline mit.1 mit.2 baseline mit.1 mit.2
5
0.1 38.347 27.056 26.221 Yes No No
0.3 39.839 28.548 29.129 Yes No Yes
0.5 45.004 35.724 38.690 Yes Yes Yes
4
0.1 37.069 30.731 29.811 Yes No No
0.3 40.233 33.183 34.868 Yes Yes No
0.5 45.823 38.349 38.914 Yes Yes Yes
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Ev and avoiding collisions, in some attack cases. Overall, these numbers demonstrate that
our heuristic approach produces nearly equivalent results to the optimal MPC approach.
Table 2.3 shows data for Ev collisions for various cases involving two platoons disband-
ing, wherein the total number of platoons is equal to 10. The optimal attack is found to
occur by targeting the 10th (lead) and 9th platoons in the formation at times equal to 2 s and
100 s, respectively within Ts. We can see that the baseline control produces collisions for
all attack cases. However, with either mit.1 or mit.2, the reduction in velocity is minimized
and crashes are avoided completely in some cases. Also, the results for both mitigation
approaches are nearly equivalent. Furthermore, in comparison with Table 2.2, even with
mitigation, the two-platoon disbanding attack results in more crashes, which indicates that
it is a more severe attack, as compared to disbanding a single platoon.
2.5 Experimental Validation
We validate our proposed mitigation algorithm on a platooning testbed and compare
it with the baseline algorithm i.e., regular platoon control law with integrated collision
avoidance.
2.5.1 Hardware Setup
Our experimental setup consists of small robots that represent vehicles in a stream of
platoons and a motion capture system for tracking as shown in Fig. 2.4. We implemented
the disbanding attack and the traveled distance mitigation algorithm on three 3-vehicle
platoons, denoted as per the convention shown in Fig. 2.2. The 3rd (leading) platoon
disbands and the response of other two platoons is captured with the different algorithms
in place.
Each robot is affixed with multiple IR markers which are tracked by the Optitrack
motion capture system consisting of 24 IR cameras and the Motive software that enables us
to capture the robot positions. This position data is then streamed to a command computer
where an interface application utilizing the Robot Operating System (ROS) [35] framework
makes the gathered position data for each robot available to our controller application. This
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Fig. 2.4. Experimental environment with small robots and motion capture system
application processes the position data and sends control commands accordingly to each
robot. The controller application implemented on ROS works in the following manner:
• The raw position data is processed using an Extended Kalman Filter to reduce camera
sensor noise and estimate the measured position and velocity.
• Pure Pursuit Controller utilizes the extimated positions and circular path coordinates
from the experiment environment to calculate the angular velocity command for each
vehicle.
• The estimated data of all vehicles is used to calculate the relative distance and ve-
locity between consecutive vehicles. This is then fed to a High level Controller which
implements the platoon model following the bidirectional control law as explained in
Section 2.2.1 and provides desired acceleration values for the robots.
• The mitigation and baseline algorithm then modify the acceleration values from the
High level Controller in case a disbanding attack is detected.
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• As the vehicles only act upon instantaneous velocity commands, these acceleration
values along with current measured velocities are used to calculate the desired veloc-
ities for each vehicle. The desired linear velocities for the vehicles are achieved using
a PI controller which acts as our Low Level Controller. This controller calculates the
linear velocity commands for each vehicle such that the measured and the desired
velocities match.
Each robot consists of a 32-bit ARM-based mbedNXP LPC1768 microcontroller on the
Pololu m3pi platform to which the Digi Xbee receivers are interfaced. The corresponding
Xbee transmitter is connected to the command computer. These Xbee modules allow us to
establish a wireless communication channel using the Zigbee protocol over which the angular
and linear velocity commands calculated for each robot using our controller application are
then broadcast. The firmware on these robots receive the broadcast messages and calculate
the left and right wheel speeds from the received angular and linear velocities as per the
differential drive model.
2.5.2 Experimental Results
Fig. 2.5 shows individual velocity profiles for the vehicles under consideration (three
platoons with three robots in each). Fig. 2.5a indicates the effect on velocity due to
disbanding for the baseline control structure, given in Section 2.2.1, wherein we can see
vehicles in the last platoon not only slow down suddenly, but one of them stops, in response
to the disbanding of the lead platoon. Fig. 2.5b and 2.5c give the velocity profiles when
intact robots use the traveled distance mitigation approach, wherein it can be seen that
the speed of vehicles in second and third platoon slow down gradually and then begin to
accelerate. This mitigation approach was tested with ts = 0.5s and 1s, respectively. The
point labeled as A in Fig. 2.5a, 2.5b, and 2.5c indicate that the platoons are in a steady
state. Point B marks the time at which the attack on the lead platoon is emulated, causing
all of its vehicles to disband and suddenly decelerate. Deceleration patterns of the vehicles
after point B for the baseline structure clearly indicate a sudden drop in velocities for the
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Fig. 2.5. Vehicles’ velocities upon disbanding of platoon 3 for baseline control structure
and proposed heuristic mitigation algorithm with ts = 0.5s and 1s.
following platoons, causing some vehicles to come to a complete stop as indicated by point
C.
While there are no collisions with the baseline control, sudden deceleration/ accelera-
tion was observed. However, such abrupt changes in velocities are not observed when our
proposed heuristic mitigation is in place (see Fig. 2.5b and 2.5c, where point C shows that
none of the vehicles need to come to a halt). With the mitigation approach, vehicles com-
fortably decelerate and gradually accelerate to recover and maintain desired spacing and
velocities, all without collisions. Furthermore, Ev was calculated for the three experiments
and it was equal to 30.02%, 21.82% and 19.73% for Fig. 2.5a, 2.5b and 2.5c, respectively.
These numbers indicate that with increasing ts, the change in velocity is even smoother
and more gradual, yet collisions do not occur. However, with ts = 1 s, vehicles come to
closer proximity, when compared with the results of ts = 0.5 s. For reference, we have also
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uploaded short videos of our experiments [36].
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented and studied a disbanding attack which targets vehicular
platoons and causes severe deviations in speed, including stop-and-go traffic and collisions
between upstream vehicles. The attack exploits human-in-the-loop control, whereby a ve-
hicle switches from automated control to human driving at the onset of an attack against
a vehicle sensing system. Calculations of key attack factors, such as identifying both the
platoon(s) to disband and time to disband, were carried out. Additionally, we proposed two
mitigation algorithms that reduce sudden velocity changes and also decrease the number of
accidents, hence ensuring resilient performance for platoons. Simulations and experimental
results corroborate theory, displaying improved velocity deviations. Finally, the proposed
heuristic mitigation approach was implemented and verified on a hardware testbed with a
motion capture system and mobile robots representing platoons, and even at this stage, it
showed better performance than baseline control structure.
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CHAPTER 3
REACHABILITY ANALYSIS FOR CONSTRAINED FALSE DATA INJECTION
ATTACKS ON VEHICULAR PLATOONS
Vehicular platooning promises to bring faster, safer, and more efficient transporta-
tion. Automated platooned vehicles will rely on information obtained from inter-vehicle
communication channels and on-board sensors to make driving decisions and achieve pla-
tooning. However, such reliance creates an opportunity for safety violating attacks intended
to disrupt platoon formation and cause accidents. In this chapter, we investigate attacks
mounted against the sensing functionality of platooned vehicles with the goal of manipu-
lating the relative distance and speed measurements. More specifically, we are interested in
approximating the set of final unsafe states, that can be reached by mounting realistically-
constrained attacks capable of injecting false-data against an attacked sensor(s). For that
purpose, we will use reachability analysis which enables us to realize whether it is possible
to drive a platoon from initial to final states, given performance and physical bounds. Our
results suggest that this type of attack is able to steer a platoon towards dangerous states
and thereby generate impacts on passengers’ safety by causing high-speed crashes.
3.1 Introduction
Vehicular platooning is a cyber-physical system (CPS) that employs automation, com-
munication, sensing, and decision making capabilities with the objectives of combining a
number of automated vehicles to follow each other while regulating their movements and
maintaining predefined inter-vehicle distances and relative speeds. Vehicular platoons are
gaining rapid interest and development, both academically and commercially, as they have
shown numerous benefits, such as providing a safe and comfortable environment for the
passengers while allowing them to focus on tasks other than driving [1]. They also have
shown the ability to reduce traffic congestion on highways [2, 3], which leads to a better
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and more efficient usage of roads and to fuel consumption [4].
In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, each platooned vehicle implements a
properly designed controller that determines the appropriate throttle and brakes commands
[5] by using information collected from local sensors and from other vehicles through either
inter-vehicle communication [6] or external networks [7]. As a result, vehicular platoons
have a potential attack surface that can be exploited by malicious parties (attackers) and
may result in disruptive platoon behavior. For this reason, security of platooning CPS has
been widely researched in order to both define possible vulnerabilities that can be exploited
by attackers, and to understand possible consequences, such as disarranging normal per-
formance of platooned vehicles and causing fatal impacts, such as collisions at high speeds
[8] or significantly-increased energy consumption in platoon vehicles due to modification of
the behavior of one vehicle [9]. In addition, attacking vehicular platoons could also induce
oscillations in vehicle movements, which lead to passenger discomfort, platoon instability,
and reduced efficiency of platoon operation. These consequences can be triggered by an
attacker capable of either controlling one vehicle in the platoon [10], multiple vehicles in a
platoon [11], or of modifying messages transmitted between vehicles through communication
channels [12, 13, 14]. False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are carried out by an adversary ca-
pable of manipulating the readings of CPS sensors, and thereby causing misbehavior in the
decision-making process. Such attacks have been proven possible in previous works, such
as [15], wherein authors propose conditions under which an FDI attack could destabilize an
LTI control system without being detected. It has also been shown that an FDI attack could
be staged against an electricity power grid, whereby the attacker had full or limited access
to some of the installed meters or network topology and could thereby introduce errors in
the states estimation, which could lead to unreliable operation of the power grid [16, 17].
Furthermore, the states estimation process was also the target of another FDI attack, as
presented in [18], which was designed to compromise a subset of LTI discrete-system sensors
without being detected.
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As mentioned earlier, a platooning CPS controller requires measurements from on-
board sensors for its operation. Existing work has demonstrated that RADAR, LIDAR,
cameras, and ultra-sonic sensors, the most-used sensors in automated vehicles, can be vic-
tims of FDI attacks executed at a distance. For example, [19] presents external jamming
and spoofing attacks that can be carried out against ultrasonic sensors and cameras, and
experimental results show a possibility of malfunctioning a Tesla vehicle. Also, it was proven
possible to falsify the readings of a vehicle’s RADAR [20], LIDAR, or cameras [21] and, as
a result, disrupt the behavior of the automated vehicle. In addition, FDI attacks on a ve-
hicle’s sensors have demonstrated impacts on the vehicle’s platoon. Authors of [22] provide
an analysis of different types of platooning controllers under FDI attacks mounted against
RADAR and LIDAR sensors. Their results showed that such an attack could potentially
lead to a crash between vehicles further behind the attacked vehicle. Also, the authors of
[23] studied FDI attacks which compromised vehicular sensors measuring position, velocity,
or both. The results showed multiple impacts, including passenger discomfort and collisions.
Reachability analysis defines the reachable set of a dynamic system, that is the set
of all system states that can be attained within a finite time. Considering the physical
bounds and performance constraints of the system states and inputs, reachability analysis
helps us verify whether from a given initial point, a system can eventually reach another
given final point. With that in mind, reachability can be applied to real-world applications
where safety must be determined, such as collision avoidance problems in airplanes [24]
and vehicles [25], or controller design for the platooning of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
[26, 27].
In this chapter, we are also concerned with the safety of a vehicular platoon operating
in an adversarial setting wherein it is possible to target one or more of the platoon vehicle’s
sensors with an FDI attack. Particularly, we are interested in defining the set of final states
that the platoon can reach as a result of experiencing a manipulation in the measurements
obtained from one or more of the locally-equipped sensors. For that purpose, we will use the
optimal control-based reachability approach to determine the reachable (final) set of states,
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as it allows us to include attacker capabilities, physical limits on the vehicle’s acceleration
and speed, and resolution and physical limits of the attacked sensor(s) in the problem
formulation as constraints, as will be explained Section 3.4. Furthermore, this approach
requires a prior definition of the final states of interest. For that reason, and because our
primary concern is the safety of the platoon, we will focus on unsafe states which can be
translated as a collision between two or more vehicles in the platoon and at different speeds.
Regardless of the type of equipped sensors, from this point on we will refer to the sensors
measuring relative distance and speed as range and range-rate sensors, respectively. The
contributions of this chapter are:
• We analyze the performance of a vehicular platoon undergoing an FDI attack mounted
against one or multiple locally equipped range and range rate sensors. Specifically, we
will define what conditions and capabilities are required by an adversary to make such
an attack capable of violating the safety of the platoon.
• To generalize the problem, we will define threat models for targeting either the range
sensors, range-rate sensors, or both. Also, we analyze the resulting impacts from those
attacks
• After defining both the platoon and threat models, wherein the attack vector will be
acting as the new control input to the system, we will use the optimal control-based
reachability approach to determine the final reachable set by the platoon. This will
show whether collision(s) are possible as a result of an FDI attack.
3.1.1 Related work
In the context of FDI attacks on vehicular sensors, the authors of [19] present exter-
nal jamming and spoofing attacks that can be carried out against ultrasonic sensors and
cameras, and experimental results even show a possibility of malfunctioning a Tesla vehicle.
Also, it was proven possible to falsify the readings of a vehicle’s RADAR [20], LIDAR, or
cameras [21], and, as a result, disrupt the behavior of the automated vehicle. In addition,
FDI attacks on a vehicle’s sensors have demonstrated impacts on the vehicle’s platoon.
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Authors of [22] provide an analysis performed on various types of platooning controllers
under FDI attacks mounted against RADAR and LIDAR sensors. Their results show that
such attacks could potentially lead to a crash between vehicles further behind the attacked
vehicle. Also, [23] studied FDI attacks which compromised platooned vehicles sensors mea-
suring position, velocity, or both. These results show multiple impacts including passenger
discomfort and collisions.
In the context of conducting reachability analyses, various methods have been proposed
for obtaining the reachable sets. In [28, 29], ellipsoidal techniques are used to calculates
outer elliptical bounds around the reachable set of a linear system. This method has been
applied in problems such as finding algorithms for collision avoidance in UAVs [30] and
determining new artificial physical bounds for a system’s actuators [31]. Another method
is generally known as Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) reachability [24] and has been used to solve
problems such as auto landing of an aircraft [32], and path planning for UAVs [33]. Finally,
another method suggested for determining the reachable set is based upon using optimal
control theory, wherein the final states points are included in the formulation of an opti-
mization problem which, in turn, calculates the appropriate control sequence required to
drive the system towards those final states and also considers state/input constraints [34].
This method has been applied in problems such as determining a safe landing area for a
moon lander [35], and suggesting an alternate trajectory for vehicles to be tracked to avoid
colliding with other vehicles [36].
In the context of security of vehicular platooning, reachability analysis has been used
to quantify the impacts of attacks mounted against vehicular platoons. In [31], the authors
defined reachable sets that a CACC-based platoon could reach while experiencing an attack
on its V2V communication channels. The resulting sets included unsafe states for the
platoon, wherein two or more vehicles could crash. In [37], the authors investigated the
behavior of an ACC-based platoon during a motion modifying attack, wherein the attacker
controls one of the platooned vehicles. The resulting reachable sets revealed that accidents
are possible as a result of that attack as well. Similar to the aforementioned works, we are
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also using reachability analysis to study the safety of a vehicular platoon. However, we will
use that analysis with realistic scenarios of FDI attacks.
3.1.2 Organization
Section 3.2 explains the vehicle, vehicular platoon, and threat models used in this
chapter. In Section 3.3, we present an algorithm to determine an FDI attack vector that
induces instability in the attacked vehicle. Section 3.4 describes the approach used in
this chapter to conduct the reachability analysis for constrained FDI attacks on platooned
vehicles’ sensors while Section 3.5 discusses the reachable sets resulting form those attacks.
Finally, conclusions are given in Section 3.6.
3.2 System Model
The modeling of platooned vehicles as well as the control strategies, to achieve pla-
tooning, are discussed in this section.
3.2.1 Vehicle model
We consider a homogeneous platoon with n vehicles, which means that all vehicles
share the same dynamics, controller design, and performance characteristics. In general,
each platooned vehicle’s dynamics are described as
x˙(t) = f(x(t),u(t)) (3.1)
where x and u are the state and input (commands) vectors, respectively. The evolution of
each vehicle’s states over time is described as follows
x˙i(t) = vi(t)
v˙i(t) = ui(t), for i = 1, . . . , n
(3.2)
where xi, vi, and ui to the i
th vehicle’s absolute position, absolute velocity, and commanded
acceleration, respectively, and n is the number of vehicles in a platoon.
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V1 V2 V3 · · · Vn−1 Vn
r1,2 r˙1,2
r2,1 r˙2,1
r2,3 r˙2,3
r3,2 r˙3,2
rn−1,n r˙n−1,n
rn,n−1 r˙n,n−1
inter-vehicle separation
direction of travel
Fig. 3.1. A platoon with n vehicles. ri,j and r˙i,j represent the relative distance and speed,
respectively, measured by the ith vehicle’s range and range-rate sensors with respect to the
jth vehicle.
3.2.2 Platoon model
In this chapter, we consider a platoon with n vehicles, as shown in Fig. 3.1, where each
vehicle is equipped with range and range-rate sensors. For platooned vehicles equipped with
an ACC control structure, the latter utilizes information provided by the local vehicular
sensors. For each platooned vehicle, the error coordinates are defined as follows
exi(t) = xi+1(t)− xi(t)− xd
evi(t) = vi+1(t)− vi(t)
(3.3)
where exi and evi refer to the i
th vehicle’s position and velocity errors, respectively, and xd
is a constant denoting inter-vehicle desired separation. It should be noted that error states
are fully measured using the locally equipped range and range-rate sensors. The evolution
of error states over time can be described as follows
e˙xi(t) = vi+1(t)− vi(t)
e˙vi(t) = ui+1(t)− ui(t)
(3.4)
The position and velocity errors can be described for all vehicles in a platoon using the
following state-space representation
e˙(t) = A1e(t) +B1u(t) (3.5)
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where
e(t) =
[
ex1(t) . . . exn(t) ev1(t) . . . evn(t)
]T
u(t) =
[
u1(t) . . . un(t)
]T
Matrices A1 and B1 are described in Appendix B. Each platooned vehicle uses a bidirectional
control law to determine its commanded acceleration [38]. Bidirectional control is able to
guarantee platoon string stability, which maintains proper traffic flow [5, 38], and it does
not need any (V2V) transmitted information to generate driving decisions. Each vehicle’s
commanded acceleration is calculated according to its position in the platoon. For the last
vehicle in a given platoon, we have
u1(t) = kpex1(t) + kdev1(t), (3.6)
where kp and kd are the controller’s proportional and derivative gains, respectively. For the
rest of the vehicles in the platoon, we have
ui(t) = kp
(
exi(t)− exi−1(t)
)
+ kd
(
evi(t)− evi−1(t)
)
,
for i = 2, . . . , n
(3.7)
Commanded acceleration of all vehicle can be combined in the following state-space repre-
sentation
u(t) = A2e(t) (3.8)
matrix A2 is also defined in Appendix B.
3.2.3 Threat model
FDI attacks against vehicular sensors aim to generate harmful impacts in the platoon
by injecting false data into the attacked sensor(s) in order to confuse their measurements.
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Existing work has demonstrated that the most-used sensors in automated vehicles, such as
LIDAR or cameras, can be jammed or spoofed, and that such attacks can be accomplished
at a distance [19, 20, 21, 39]. For the purpose of demonstrating FDI attack impacts in
our study, we assume the following: First, the attacker is informed of the platoon model,
which includes the controller design and type of sensors used. Second, the attacker has
the capability of compromising the reading of one or multiple sensors equipped on one or
more platooned vehicles by using drones, units installed on the road for that purpose, or by
an attacker-controlled vehicle driving alongside the platoon. Finally, the attack sequence
(vector) can only assume discrete values such that once injected it does not violate the reso-
lution of the attacked sensor(s). The last assumption helps create realistic attack scenarios.
It also helps distinguish feasible attacks from non feasible ones.
1. Attacking Range Sensors: in this case, the commanded acceleration becomes as follows
u1(t) = kp
(
ex1(t) + δx1(t)
)
+ kdev1(t)
...
un(t) = kp
((
exn(t) + δxn(t)
)− exn−1(t))
+ kd
(
evn(t)− evn−1(t)
)
(3.9)
where δxi is the amount of false-data injected against the i
th vehicle’s range sensor.
(3.9) can be rewritten as follows
u(t) = A2e(t) +B2,xδ(t)
δ(t) =
[
δx1(t) . . . δxn(t)
]T (3.10)
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2. Attacking Range-rate Sensors: in this case, the commanded acceleration becomes as
follows
u1(t) = kpex1(t) + kd
(
ev1(t) + δv1(t)
)
...
un(t) = kp
(
exn(t)− exn−1(t)
)
+ kd
((
evn(t) + δvn(t)
)− evn−1(t))
(3.11)
where δvi is the amount of false-data injected against the i
th vehicle’s range-rate
sensor. (3.11) can be rewritten as follows
u(t) = A2e(t) +B2,vδ(t)
δ(t) =
[
δv1(t) . . . δvn(t)
]T (3.12)
3. Attacking Both Range and Range-rate Sensors: in this case, the commanded acceler-
ation becomes as follows
u1(t) = kp
(
ex1(t) + δx1(t)
)
+ kd
(
ev1(t) + δv1(t)
)
...
un(t) = kp
((
exn(t) + δxn(t)
)− exn−1(t))
+ kd
((
evn(t) + δvn(t)
)− evn−1(t))
(3.13)
which can be rewritten as follows
u(t) = A2e(t) +B2,xvδ(t)
δ(t) =
[
δx1(t) . . . δxn(t) δv1(t) . . . δvn(t)
]T (3.14)
Matrices B2,x, B2,v, and B2,xv are given in Appendix B.
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Considering the presence of attack vectors, acceleration commands, given in (3.8), become
as follows
u(t) = A2e(t) +Baδ(t)
Ba ∈
{
B2,x, B2,v, B2,xv
} (3.15)
by substituting (3.15) into (3.5), we get
e˙(t) = Ace(t) +Bcδ(t)
Ac = A1 +B1A2
Bc = B1Ba
(3.16)
3.3 Formulating an Instability-inducing FDI Attack Against Vehicular Pla-
toons
In this section, we will formulate an FDI attack vector that aims to cause instability
in the movement of a vehicular platoon. That means, by injecting the formulated attack
vector into the targeted sensor(s), the attacked vehicle(s) will begin to behave erratically by
accelerating/decelerating and, as a result, relative distance and speed will grow over time
and accidents may occur.
3.3.1 Attacks on a single sensor
We will start by formulating an FDI attack vector that could be mounted against either
the range or the range-rate sensor equipped on one of the platooned vehicles, whose flawed
commanded acceleration is described as follows
u¯i(t) = kp
(
exi(t)− exi−1(t)
)
+ kd
(
evi(t)− evi−1(t)
)
+ kaδi(t)
= ui(t) + kaδi(t)
(3.17)
where ka is equal to either kp if the range sensor is targeted or kd otherwise. On the
other hand, for the attacked vehicle the evolution of distance and speed errors over time is
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described as follows
˙¯exi(t) = vi+1(t)− vi(t)
= e¯vi(t)
˙¯evi(t) = ui+1(t)− u¯i(t)
(3.18)
by substituting (3.17) into (3.18), we get
˙¯evi(t) = ui+1(t)− ui(t)− kaδi(t) (3.19)
In order to show platoon instability as a result of an FDI attack, we will use the
following Lyapunov candidate function
V (e¯) = e¯T (t)P e¯(t) (3.20)
where
e¯(t) =
[
e¯xi(t) e¯vi(t)
]T
(3.21)
and (P = P T ) is a symmetric positive definite function described as follows
P =
P1 P2
P2 P3
 (3.22)
by differentiating (3.20) we get (time notation is omitted)
V˙ (e¯) = 2e¯xiP1 ˙¯exi + 2e¯viP2e¯vi + 2
(
e¯xiP2 + e¯viP3
)
˙¯evi (3.23)
by substituting (3.18) and (3.19) into (3.23) we get the following
V˙ (e¯) = 2e¯xiP1 ˙¯exi + 2e¯viP2e¯vi + 2
(
e¯xiP2 + e¯viP3
)(
ui+1 − ui − kaδi
)
(3.24)
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we will define the following attack vector
δi =
−1
ka
(− ui+1 + ui + h1e¯xi + h2e¯vi) (3.25)
by substituting (3.25) into (3.24) we get the following
V˙ (e¯) = 2e¯xiP1 ˙¯exi + 2e¯viP2e¯vi + 2
(
e¯xiP2 + e¯viP3
)(
h1e¯xi + h2e¯vi
)
(3.26)
which can be rewritten as follows
V˙ (e¯) = e¯TQe¯ (3.27)
where
Q =
 2h1P2 P1 + h2P2 + h1P3
P1 + h2P2 + h1P3 2
(
P2 + h2P3
)
 (3.28)
In order to destabilize the platoon, the attacker must select gains h1 and h2 such that
V˙ is not negative. Therefore, we will select the attack gains such that the matrix Q is
positive semi-definite as follows
2h1P2 ≥ 0
2
(
P2 + h2P3
) ≥ 0
4h1P2
(
P2 + h2P3
)− (P1 + h2P2 + h1P3)2 ≥ 0
(3.29)
and the attack vector is given by (3.25).
3.3.2 Attacks on two sensors
In this section, we will formulate an FDI attack vector that could be launched against
both the range and range-rate sensors equipped on one of the platooned vehicles, whose
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commanded acceleration is described as follows
u¯i(t) = kp
(
exi(t)− exi−1(t)
)
+ kd
(
evi(t)− evi−1(t)
)
+ kpδi,1(t) + kdδi,2(t)
= ui(t) + kpai,1(t) + kdai,2(t)
(3.30)
by substituting (3.30) into (3.18) we get
˙¯evi(t) = ui+1(t)− ui(t)− kpδi,1(t)− kdδi,2(t) (3.31)
We will use the same candidate Lyapunov function given in (3.20) to derive conditions
for platoon instability. Therefore, (3.31) is substituted into (3.23) and we get
V˙ (e¯) = 2e¯xiP1e¯vi + 2e¯viP2e¯vi + 2
(
e¯xiP2 + e¯viP3
)(
ui+1 − ui − kpδi,1 − kdδi,2
)
(3.32)
we will define the following two attack vectors
δi,1 =
−1
2kp
(− ui+1 + ui + h1e¯xi + h2e¯vi)
δi,2 =
−1
2kd
(− ui+1 + ui + h1e¯xi + h2e¯vi) (3.33)
by substituting (3.33) into (3.32) we get the following
V˙ (e¯) = 2e¯xiP1e¯vi + 2e¯viP2e¯vi + 2
(
e¯xiP2 + e¯viP3
)(
h1e¯xi + h2e¯vi
)
(3.34)
which is similar to the expression given in (3.26). As a result, we can reach the same
conclusions for selecting the gains h1 and h2 as shown in (3.29).
3.3.3 Finding the attack vector sequence
In this section, we will explain how to find the FDI attack vector sequence such that the
resulting vector is realistic in constraints and once injected in the attacked sensor instability
is induced in the platoon. We will begin by defining the matrix P as the identity matrix.
As a result, (3.29) can be rewritten as
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h2 ≥ 0
h1 ≤ −1
(3.35)
Therefore, the attack vectors given in (3.25) and (3.33) will destabilize the platoon if
the gains h1 and h2 are selected according to (3.35). However, to make the FDI attack more
realistic, we still need to consider the following constraints
• the instantaneous values of the FDI attack vector cannot assume any continuous
values. That is, the attack sequence will result in spoofed measurements agree with
the resolution of the attacked sensor(s). As a result, the instantaneous values are
discrete and selected from a predefined range of feasible values.
• once injected, the instantaneous values of the FDI attack vector cannot result in a
spoofed measurement that violates the physical bounds of the attacked sensor.
• the instantaneous values of the FDI attack vector will meet the instability condition
given in (3.35), as will be explained later.
Since the instantaneous values are selected from a predefined range, it is possible that
at some time steps more than one value meet the aforementioned constraints. To handle
that, the attack vector sequence will be selected based on minimizing the following cost
function
Jc =
t+Nh∑
k=t
δTi (k)Qδi(k) (3.36)
where i is the index of the attacked vehicle, Nh is a time horizon, and (Q = Q
T > 0) is a
weighing matrix. Equation (3.36) can be rewritten as
Jc = δ
T
i (t)Qδi(t) + · · ·+ aδTi (t+Nh)Qδi(t+Nh)
= ∆T Q¯∆
(3.37)
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where
∆ =
[
δi(t) . . . δi(t+Nh)
]
Q¯ =

Q 0 . . . 0
0 Q . . . 0
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Q

In order to make the calculations more tractable, and using (3.35), one of the attacker
gains, h1 or h2, will be assigned a constant value. For example, we can define the following
h1 = −1 (3.38)
by substituting (3.38) into (3.25) and rewriting the latter we get the following
h2 =
−1
e¯vi(t)
(
kaδi(t)− ui+1(t) + ui(t) + e¯xi(t)
) ≥ 0 (3.39)
which means that the attack vector sequence must be determined such that the condition
given in (3.39) is true. Using the same approach, we can get the following conditions for
the attack vectors given in (3.33)
h2 =
−1
e¯vi(t)
(
2kpδi,1(t)− ui+1(t) + ui(t) + e¯xi(t)
) ≥ 0 (3.40)
and
h2 =
−1
e¯vi(t)
(
2kdδi,2(t)− ui+1(t) + ui(t) + e¯xi(t)
) ≥ 0 (3.41)
In summary, (3.39) defines the instability condition for the case of attacking one sensor
while (3.40) and (3.41) define the instability conditions for the case of attacking two sensors.
Next, we need to determine the attack vector sequence ∆. For that purpose, we will use
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the following Branch and Bound based algorithm
1. Inputs to the algorithm are: the current measurements of the relative distance and
speed of the attacked vehicle, the current commanded acceleration of the attacked
and preceding vehicles, and a predefined range of feasible values for the attack vector.
Output of the algorithm is the attack vector sequence ∆.
2. At the current time step k = t, set the following
J >> 0
∆ = zeros(Nh, 1)
Jc = 0 (initially)
∆c = zeros(Nh, 1)
(3.42)
3. Get the current measurements of relative distance and speed for the attacked vehicle
and use them to calculate e¯xi(k) and e¯vi(k). Also, determine ui(k) and ui+1(k).
4. Select a candidate value for δi(k) from the predefined range.
5. Depending on the number of attacked sensors, calculate h2 using either (3.39) or (3.40)
and (3.41). Does h2 satisfy the corresponding instability condition(s)? If yes, then
continue. If no, then go to (4).
6. Once injected into the attacked sensor(s), is the spoofed measurement(s) within the
bounds of the sensor(s)? If yes, then continue. If no, then go to (4).
7. Store δi(k) in ∆c and calculate the following
Jc = ∆
T
c Q¯∆c (3.43)
8. Is Jc ≤ J ? If yes, then continue. If no, then go to (4), which is the Bound part.
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9. Is k = t+Nh ? If yes, then continue. If no, then go to (12), which is the Branch part.
10. Set the following
J = Jc
∆ = ∆c
(3.44)
11. Have all the values in the range been tested? If yes, then go to (13). If no, then go to
(4).
12. For the next time step k = t + 1, determine e¯xi(k) and e¯vi(k) using the model given
in (3.18) and use them to calculate ui(k) and ui+1(k). Then go to (4).
13. We have determined ∆.
The steps for determining the FDI attack vector ∆ are given in Algorithm 2. Fig. 3.2
shows simulation results for two attack cases and using the formulated attack vectors given
in (3.25) and (3.33). In this simulation, we have a platoon of ten vehicles and an attacker
is targeting the range and range-rate sensors of the lead (tenth) vehicle. Before the attack,
the platoon is travelling at steady-state. That is, the desired inter-vehicle separation of 5 m
and a desired speed of 30 m/s are achieved for all vehicles in the platoon. Also, the attack
vector sequence was determined using Algorithm 2. For the results shown in Fig. 3.2a and
3.2c, the range sensor of the lead (tenth) vehicle is targeted with an FDI attack vector given
in (3.25) and determined using Algorithm 2. We can see in Fig. 3.2a how the inter-vehicle
separation of the attacked vehicle, with respect to the following (ninth) vehicle, is growing
larger than the desired separation and then the targeted vehicle collides with the following
vehicle at time almost equals to 28 s. This collision happens is because the injected FDI
attack vector is misleading the platooning controller of the attacked vehicle and, as a result,
the generated control commands are manipulated. We can also see in Fig. 3.2c that the
collision happens at a high relative speed of almost -3.5 m/s.
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Algorithm 2: Determining an optimal FDI attack vector
Input: for the current time step (k = t) the measurements of the relative distance
and speed of the attacked vehicle, the current commanded acceleration of
the attacked and preceding vehicles, and a predefined range of feasible
values ar for the attack vector.
Output: attack vector sequence ∆.
1 set J >> 0
2 ∆← zeros(Nh, 1)
3 Jc ← 0
4 ∆c ← zeros(Nh, 1) ;
5 for i = 1 : |ar| do
6 δi(k)← ar(i) ;
7 h2 ← either (3.39) or (3.40) and (3.41) (depending on the number of attacked
sensors) ;
8 if (h2 ≤ 0) then
9 if (δi(k) does not violate the attacked sensor bounds) then
10 store δi(k) into ∆c ;
11 Jc ← ∆Tc Q¯∆c ;
12 if (Jc < J) then
13 if (k < t+Nh) then
14 start the algorithm for the next time step (k = t+ 1) where the
inputs e¯xi(k) and e¯vi(k) are calculated using using (3.18) and
use them to calculate ui(k) and ui+1(k);
15 else
16 J ← Jc ;
17 ∆← ∆c ;
For the results shown in Fig. 3.2b and 3.2d, both the range and range rate sensors of
the lead (tenth) vehicle are targeted with FDI attack vectors given in (3.33) and determined
using Algorithm 2. Similar to attack case above, we can also see in Fig. 3.2b how the inter-
vehicle separation of the attacked vehicle, with respect to the following (ninth) vehicle, is
growing larger than the desired separation and then the targeted vehicle collides with the
following vehicle at time almost equals to 11.8 s. This collision also happens due to the
influence of the two FDI vectors on the platooning controller of the attacked vehicle. We can
see, however, in Fig. 3.2d that in this attack case the collision happens at a higher relative
speed of almost -6 m/s. In summary, these simulation results show that it is possible to
craft an FDI attack vector to target one or two locally equipped sensors of a platooned
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Fig. 3.2. (a) and (c) show inter-vehicle separation and relative speed profiles, respectively,
of a ten-vehicle platoon where the lead (tenth) vehicle’s range sensors is targeted with an
FDI attack vector, calculated using Algorithm 2. (b) and (d) show inter-vehicle separation
and relative speed profiles, respectively, of a ten-vehicle platoon where the lead (tenth)
vehicle’s range and range rate sensors are targeted with FDI attack vectors, both calculated
using Algorithm 2.
vehicles and disrupt the formation. Furthermore, these results also show that such FDI
attacks are able to induce harmful impacts on the attacked vehicle , such as collisions and
at high relative speeds.
3.4 Reachability Analysis For Constrained FDI Attacks
Generally, reachability analysis is a mathematical tool which provides information
about the evolution of dynamic system states over time considering that the system may
have physical constraints on the control inputs and the states. In this work, we will use
this analysis to answer the following question: ”Given the attacker capability to manipulate
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one or more functionalities of the vehicle’s automation system, is it possible to drive the
vehicular platoon to an unsafe state (i.e., collisions between two or more vehicles within the
platoon)? If so, what is the speed of impact (collision)?”
We use the optimal control based reachability method [34, 35] in order to compute the
reachable set of a platoon undergoing an FDI attack. Using this method, the error state
space is divided into a number of equidistant target points es and for each one of them an
optimal control problem is solved to determine whether a feasible trajectory exists between
initial states e0 and the target states es. Mathematically, we seek a solution to the following
optimization problem
minimize
δ(.)
J =
1
2
||Ce(m)− es||22 (3.45)
subject to
• initial error states.
• dynamics of the platoon, which are the error states, acceleration (control commands),
and the FDI vector.
• constraints on the state, input, targeted sensors, and FDI vector.
• the FDI attack vector is determined such that the increment/decrement of the spoofed
measurements is according to the attacked sensor(s) resolution.
The matrix C defines the target vehicle, by selecting its position and velocity errors
from the state vector e. The attacker intends to cause a collision with the target vehicle,
while the attacked vehicle is where the attacker injects the FDI attack vector. If a solution
can be found for (3.45), then there is an attack sequence δ(.) which can minimize the
distance between the final state of the platoon e(m) and es, meaning the attacker can cause
the platoon to steer towards es. If, on the other hand, a solution does not exist, then the
attacker cannot drive the platoon to the candidate states es.
Since our primary concern is determining the safety of the vehicular platoon while
experiencing an FDI attack, we will merely define es as the unsafe points in the error state
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space, that is, the points wherein the position error is equal to −xd (for collisions), and for
various velocity errors (speed of impact). In order to solve the problem in (3.45) numerically,
we need the following formulations
3.4.1 Evolution of errors state vector
For an initial state vector e(0), the error coordinates of the platoon , given in (3.16),
will develop over time for k = 0, 1, . . . ,m as follows
e(1) = Ae(0) +Bδ(0)
e(2) = Ae(1) +Bδ(1) = A2e(0) +ABδ(0) +Bδ(1)
...
e(m) = Ame(0) +Am−1Bδ(0) + · · ·+Bδ(m− 1)
(3.46)
final error state vector can be rewritten as
e(m) = A¯e(0) + B¯δ (3.47)
where
A¯ = Am
B¯ =
[
Am−1B Am−2B . . . B
]
δ =
[
δ(0) δ(1) . . . δ(m− 1)
]T
3.4.2 Initial conditions and constraints
We assume that the FDI attack begins once the platoon is at the steady-state, which
means both desired separation and relative speed are achieved for all vehicles. Mathemat-
ically, the steady-state of the platoon is equivalent to zero position and velocity errors for
all vehicles. Besides, in order to create realistic scenarios for the FDI attacks, we define the
following constraints
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• At any time sample, the attack vector must take a value between a predefined mini-
mum δmin and maximum δmax values, as shown below
δ(k) ≤ δmax
δ(k) ≥ δmin
which can be rewritten as follows
δ ≤ δmax
δ ≥ δmin
(3.48)
where
δmax =
[
δmax . . . δmax
]T
δmin =
[
δmin . . . δmin
]T
• As shown in section 3.2.3, the attack vector has an effect on the calculation of com-
manded acceleration. Furthermore, each vehicle has physical acceleration limits. For
those two reasons, the attack vector must not result in acceleration commands violates
a predefined minimum umin and maximum umax limits once injected into the attack
sensors, as shown below
A2e(k) +B2δ(k) ≤ umax
A2e(k) +B2δ(k) ≥ umin
using (3.46), this constraint can be rewritten as follows
K1e(0) +K2δ ≤ umax
K1e(0) +K2δ ≥ umin
(3.49)
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where
umax =
[
umax . . . umax
]T
umin =
[
umin . . . umin
]T
• Each sensor has physical limits, that is the reading is always between a minimum smin
and a maximum smax values. That means, once injected, the attack vector will not
result in a spoofed measurement outside the attacked sensor limits, as shown below
k3e(k) + δ(k) ≤ smax
k3e(k) + δ(k) ≥ smin
where k3 is a row vector specifies error states corresponding to the attacked sensors.
Using (3.46), this constraint can be rewritten as follows
K3e(0) +K4δ ≤ smax
K3e(0) +K4δ ≥ smin
(3.50)
where
smax =
[
smax . . . smax
]T
smin =
[
smin . . . smin
]T
• No collision should be induced in the platoon before reaching the end of attack window
(time), as shown below
k5e(k) + δ(k) ≤ ψ
where k5 is a row vector specifies the position errors in the state vector and ψ is the
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collision threshold, which is equal to −xd in our case. Using (3.46), this constraint is
rewritten as follows
K5e(0) +K6δ ≤ Ψ (3.51)
where
Ψ =
[
ψ . . . ψ
]T
• Increment/decrement of the FDI attack vector is predefined using a certain resolution.
For that reason, the range of possible values for δ(k) is also predefined and the solution
of the problem in (3.45) is set to integer.
All constraints given in (3.48)-(3.51) can be combined in the following compact form
Aineqδ ≤ bineq (3.52)
Definitions of K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, Aineq, and bineq are given in Appendix B.
3.4.3 Computation of FDI reachable sets
The cost function of the problem in (3.45) can be rewritten as
J =
1
2
[
(Ce(m)− es)T (Ce(m)− es)
]
=
1
2
[
eT (m)CTCe(m)− 2eTs Ce(m) + eTs es
] (3.53)
by substituting (3.47) into (3.53), we get
J = M1δ + δ
TM2δ + other terms (3.54)
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where
M1 = e
T (0)A¯TCTCB¯ − eTs CB¯
M2 = B¯
TCTCB¯
It should be noted that the ”other terms” in (3.54) do not include any attack vector sequence
and, hence, will be omitted since they do not affect the minimization of J . In summary, for
each one of the target states es of interest, the reachable set is determined by solving the
following
min
δ
M1δ + δ
TM2δ
s.t. Aineqδ ≤ bineq
(3.55)
3.5 Results and Discussion
For FDI attacks, the approach explained in Section 3.4 is used to determine the reach-
able set of the attacked platoon. CPLEX solver was used to determine the integer solution
of (3.55). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the reachable sets resulting from mounting FDI attacks
against one range sensor and range-rate sensor, respectively, equipped on one vehicle in a
platoon with (n = 4). In each table, δx,i and δv,i refer, respectively, to the attacked range
and range-rate sensors equipped on the ith attacked vehicle, Vi refers to the i
th target vehicle
in the platoon, specified by C in (3.55), ci,j refers to a collision between the i
th and jth
vehicles, and the numbers shown in parenthesis are the maximum reachable speed of impact
with respect to the two collided vehicles. For these results, resolution of the attacked sensor
is selected as 0.5 m and 0.25 m/s2 for the range and range-rate sensors, respectively. We
can see in the aforementioned tables that different impacts can be generated for different
scenarios of FDI attacks. For example, attacking the range sensor of the 1st vehicle in the
platoon can cause the target vehicle V1 and the preceding 2
nd vehicle to collide at relative
speed that could reach -1.955 m/s however attacking the same sensor does not cause any
accidents when the target is any vehicle other than the first one V1 in the platoon, as shown
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in the first row of Table 3.1. On the other hand, we can see in the second row of Table 3.2
that attacking the range-rate sensor of the 2nd vehicle in the platoon can cause a crash at
the target vehicle V3 and, in addition, the 2
nd and 4th vehicles, even though these last two
were not part of the attacker’s intention in the first place.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the reachable set resulting from attacking two range sensors
and range-rate sensors, respectively, equipped on two vehicles in the same platoon (n = 4).
In each table, δx,ij and δv,ij refer, respectively, to the attacked range and range-rate sensors
equipped on the ith and jth attacked vehicles. We see clearly that targeting two sensors,
Table 3.1. Reachable set for FDI attacks on a single range sensor
V1 V2 V3 V4
δx,1 c1,2 (-1.995) - - -
δx,2 - c2,3 (-3.996) - -
δx,3
- - c3,4 (-4.005) c3,4 (-1.848)
c4,5 (-2.003)
δx,4 - - - c4,5 (-5.987)
Table 3.2. Reachable set for FDI attacks on a single range-rate sensor
V1 V2 V3 V4
δv,1 c1,2 (-1.977) - - -
δv,2
c2,3 (-1.959)
- c2,3 (-2.017) c3,4 (-1.992) -
c4,5 (-2.210)
δv,3
- - c3,4 (-2.432) c3,4 (-3.715)
c4,5 (-2.003)
δv,4 - - - c4,5 (-7.962)
Table 3.3. Reachable set for FDI attacks on two range sensors
V1 V2 V3 V4
δx,12
c2,3 (-1.873) c2,3 (-3.666)
c1,2 (-2.021) c2,3 (-5.997) c3,4 (-2.004) c3,4 (-3.853)
c4,5 (-2.130) c4,5 (-3.997)
δx,13 c1,2 (-4.003) c1,2 (-1.807) c3,4 (-7.984) c3,4 (-5.743)
c3,4 (-3.860) c2,3 (-2.013) c4,5 (-6.002)
δx,14
c1,2 (-1.831) c1,2 (-1.468)
c1,2 (-3.988) c2,3 (-1.987) c2,3 (-1.508) c4,5 (-8.006)
c3,4 (-1.771) c3,4 (-1.982)
δx,23 - c2,3 (-4.003) c3,4 (-7.993) c3,4 (-5.723)
c3,4 (-4.008) c4,5 (-6.005)
δx,24 - c2,3 (-3.996) c2,3 (-1.833) c4,5 (-8.997)
c4,5 (-3.998) c3,4 (-1.997)
δx,34 - - c3,4 (-3.566) c4,5 (-8.270)
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regardless of type, on two different vehicles, generates a bigger reachable set for the FDI
attack and it is possible in some scenarios to cause collisions at greater speeds of impacts
when compared to the results of attacking one sensor only.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the reachable set resulting from attacking two range and range-
rate sensors equipped on one or two vehicles, respectively, in the same platoon (n = 4).
Finally, we increased the size of the platoon to (n = 5) and determined the reachable set
resulting from attacking two range-rate sensors on two different vehicles. Table 3.7 shows
the results for these attack cases.
Similarly, we have conducted the same analyses to determine the reachable sets of FDI
attacks on a single/double range or range-rate sensors however we neglected the constraint
regarding the sensor resolution, which means that δ(.) can take any continuous values
Table 3.4. Reachable set for FDI attacks on two range-rate sensors
V1 V2 V3 V4
δv,12 c1,2 (-8.004) c2,3 (-8.102) c3,4 (-4.193) -
δv,13 c1,2 (-7.989) c2,3 (-7.984) c3,4 (-3.970) -
c2,3 (-7.990)
δv,14
c1,2 (-5.585)
c1,2 (-6.003) c2,3 (-5.975) c3,4 (-7.981) c4,5 (-5.988)
c3,4 (-5.921) c3,4 (-6.138)
δv,23 - c2,3 (-5.967) c3,4 (-1.974) c3,4 (-1.982)
c4,5 (-2.015)
δv,24 - c2,3 (-5.997) c3,4 (-7.984) c4,5 (-3.991)
c3,4 (-6.224)
δv,34 - - c3,4 (-7.977) c4,5 (-6.011)
Table 3.5. Reachable set for FDI attacks on range & range-rate sensors
V1 V2 V3 V4
δx,1
δv,1
c1,2 (-1.866)
c1,2 (-2.010) c2,3 (-1.987) - -
c3,4 (-2.166)
δx,2
δv,2
- c2,3 (-1.991) - -
c3,4 (-2.593)
δx,3
δv,3
- - c3,4 (-1.799) c4,5 (-1.791)
δx,4
δv,4
- - - c4,5 (-3.992)
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between δmin and δmax. The reason for that was to compare the results with those shown in
Tables 3.1 to 3.6. In the case of continuous δ(.), resulting reachable set was bigger in terms
of the number of induced collisions and the magnitude of the speed of impact. However,
Table 3.6. Reachable set for FDI attacks on two range & range-rate sensors
V1 V2 V3 V4
δx,12
δv,12
c1,2 (-7.984) - - -
δx,13
δv,13
c1,2 (-1.970) - - -
c2,3 (-2.532)
δx,14
δv,14
c1,2 (-4.027) c1,2 (-1.883)
c2,3 (-4.460) c2,3 (-2.004) c3,4 (-6.011) c4,5 (-3.974)
c3,4 (-4.701) c3,4 (-2.254)
δx,23
δv,23
- c2,3 (-2.015) - -
δx,24
δv,24
- c2,3 (-7.952) c3,4 (-3.963) c4,5 (-3.985)
c3,4 (-8.118)
δx,34
δv,34
- - c3,4 (-1.983) -
Table 3.7. Reachable set for FDI attacks on two range-rate sensors (n = 5)
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5
δv,12 c1,2 (-5.221) c2,3 (-8.343) - - -
δv,13 c1,2 (-7.559) c2,3 (-7.401) c3,4 (-3.720) - -
δv,14 c1,2 (-7.022) c2,3 (-6.775) c3,4 (-6.981) c4,5 (-4.218) -
c3,4 (-6.631) c3,4 (-6.138)
δv,15 c1,2 (-5.277) - - - c5,6 (-6.011)
δv,23 - c2,3 (-5.967) c3,4 (-1.974) - -
δv,24 - c2,3 (-6.127) c3,4 (-5.226) c4,5 (-4.991) -
δv,25 - c2,3 (-7.034) - - c5,6 (-6.501)
δv,34 - - c3,4 (-8.244) c4,5 (-7.935) -
δv,35 - - c3,4 (-7.900) - c5,6 (-6.113)
δv,45 - - - - c5,6 (-5.731)
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that scenario represents an unrealistic case, as it is not feasible to inject false-data that
could take any arbitrary value. In summary, whether it is an attack on a single or multiple
sensors, the reachability analysis results shown in the aforementioned tables indicate that
the impacts of FDI attacks on the sensors of platooned vehicles are serious and must be
considered during the design of platooning controllers which rely on such sensors.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on FDI attacks that can be mounted against vehicular range
and range-rate sensors. Such attacks have been shown to be possible by previous studies
and can induce accidents. As an example, we formulated an FDI attack against one or
two vehicular sensors that aims to induce instability, i.e., disrupts the platoon formation
and eventually could lead to collisions. Furthermore, we considered realistic constraints
in formulating our attack, such as a discrete attack vector sequence and non-violation
of attacked sensor(s) measurement bounds, in order to produce the most realistic attack
scenarios possible. We also employed reachability analysis to further study FDI attacks
against vehicular sensors. Our reasoning was that such an analysis would enable us to
validate whether it were possible for such attacks to cause collisions by targeting sensors on
a larger scale, such as sensors of two vehicles and/or of different types, and at which speed
of impact such collisions would be made possible. Our results indicate that FDI attacks are
serious and must be considered during the design of platooning controllers, which rely on
the measurements of potentially attackable sensors.
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CHAPTER 4
MITIGATION OF ATTACKS AGAINST HVAC SYSTEM TEMPERATURE SENSORS
USING MOVING TARGET DEFENSE
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems are considered an integral
part of smart automated buildings and are primarily employed to provide an acceptable in-
door environment in terms of thermal comfort and occupants’ air quality. The application
of appropriate control strategies in HVAC systems is important to improving the energy
efficiency of smart buildings. In this chapter, we utilize Model Predictive Control (MPC)
technique to formulate an optimal controller that aims to achieve an acceptable temperature
tracking of a desired set point in each zone of the building. To develop such a controller, a
model of the process under consideration (the smart building) is needed. For that purpose,
we employ a thermal model which captures heat storage and transfer between connected
spaces of the building, as well as the influence of outside temperature. Several previous
studies have defined potential vulnerabilities in HVAC systems that could be exploited by
parties with malicious intentions in order to induce harmful impacts. One possible vul-
nerability is manipulating the measurements of temperature sensors, which are installed in
various sections of buildings employing HVAC systems. An important factor that facilitates
such attacks against temperature sensors is the fact that the MPC controller, which uses
those sensors, is static in nature, and thus, attackers can easily induce predictable impacts.
Therefore, in this chapter, we consider attacks that modify the readings of temperature sen-
sors and show how such tampering could mislead the MPC controller and, as a result, cause
occupants’ discomfort. Furthermore, in order to counter such attacks, we suggest Moving
Target Defense (MTD) technique-based algorithms, which aim to add unpredictability to
the system by constantly changing the sensors set used by the MPC controllers and, as a
consequence, reduce the impacts of potential attacks.
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4.1 Introduction
A smart building is a term used to describe a structure that utilizes automation tech-
nology to supervise and control important functionalities/subsystems such as fire and flood
safety, lighting, heating/cooling, and building ventilation [1, 2]. Designing a smart build-
ing, or even upgrading an existing building to a smart one, requires installing sensors and
actuators to manage the relevant subsystems. Additionally, dedicated controllers are im-
plemented to collect and analyze data from sensors and thereby generate the appropriate
commands to the actuators of each subsystem. Employing advanced control algorithms is
highly critical to reduce energy consumption and operating costs in smart buildings [3].
Smart buildings can provide multiple benefits, such as improved comfort level for the oc-
cupants, efficient operation of the building’s subsystems, improved life cycle of utilities,
customizable spaces, and 24/7 monitoring, all of which result in a boost of productivity.
An HVAC system is an example of a CPS that is commonly employed in smart residen-
tial and commercial buildings, as it can provide thermal comfort and consume less energy
[4]. For the purpose of designing an appropriate controller that achieves certain goals for
HVAC systems, detailed information about the heat dynamics of the building under con-
sideration is needed. Acquiring and employing an accurate building thermal model is also
helpful with regard to the decision-making process of the controller, especially if the con-
trol strategy is highly dependent on a model of the process under control, such as MPC
technique [5, 6]. The thermal model is derived from the physical properties of buildings,
e.g. the material used in the building structure, heat storage and loss in each section of
the buildings, and interaction between physically-connected spaces. These parameters are
tailored to the form of a thermal building model. To achieve a better performance, distur-
bances such as outside weather, heat provided by presence of occupants, and machines and
devices inside each building section should be considered as well.
A number of existing works have demonstrated that it is possible for parties with ma-
licious intentions (attackers) to pose threats against the operation of some CPSs, including
threats that could lead to destabilizing and inducing collisions among platooned vehicles
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[7, 8] or an unreliable state estimation process in electrical grids [9, 10]. Also, some previous
works have suggested defenses to prevent or lessen the effects of such threats [11, 12, 13].
Similarly, in this chapter, we consider the possibility of the presence of attacks intended
to influence HVAC sensors and disrupt their performance. Specifically, we will show that
manipulating the measurements of temperature sensors by injecting false data and creating
incorrect readings could lead to deceiving HVAC systems which rely on those measurements.
Such manipulations could lead to raising the temperature in the building, thereby causing
occupant discomfort. In addition to potential attacks, incorrect measurements resulting
from defective sensors may also mislead the HVAC system, and thereby generate the same
harmful impacts mentioned above. Thus, if not detected and repaired, such sensors can pose
a threat to the operation of the corresponding HVAC system. With the goal of deterring
such threats, in this chapter, we will suggest defenses that aim to constantly change the
behaviour of the HVAC system and preemptively reduce the chances of mounting successful
attacks.
MTD has been suggested as a countermeasure intended to decrease the ability of an
attacker to influence the targeted CPS [14]. From an attacker perspective, such an ability
stems from the fact that most, if not all, CPSs are static in their operation, i.e., the com-
ponents/functionalities required for the CPS’s performance, such as sensors, actuators, or
communication channels are already assigned and rarely changed. That static nature gives
an attacker the necessary time to analyze the targeted CPS and define its weaknesses. MTD
attempts to tackle this problem by constantly and unpredictably changing the behavior of
the CPS, and thereby adding a dynamic nature. Therefore, MTD is considered a proactive
strategy [14]. In the context of control systems, the MTD mechanism utilizes switching
among available actuators and/or sensors, such that the attacker’s knowledge of the control
system becomes uncertain.
Assuming the presence of potential attacks against HVAC-equipped sensors, the main
contribution of this chapter is to suggest two MTD-based proactive algorithms, each of
which determines a random set of installed sensors to be used for the following two tasks:
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First, a partial measurement of the temperatures in some of the building’s zones. Second,
a prediction (estimation) of the temperatures in the remaining zones. To implement the
second task, we will formulate an optimal state observer that primarily relies on the col-
lected data of inputs and outputs and the randomly-selected sensor set. Achieving the two
aforementioned tasks guarantees the availability of the data (measurements) required for
the operation of the HVAC system. By continuously selecting a random set at each time
step, the attacker’s ability to induce predictable effects by targeting one or multiple sensors
is minimized.
4.1.1 Related work
In this section, we discuss some of the previous studies related to HVAC systems
security and MTD mechanism.
1. Security of HVAC systems
The authors of [15] defined possible vulnerabilities in the automation systems that
employ HVAC technology. Such vulnerabilities include the attacker’s capability to
gain physical access either to the controllers, by guessing the correct password and
shutting down the whole system, or to the interconnection between the HVAC’s crit-
ical components, such as actuators, and, as a result, generating negative impacts. To
counter such vulnerabilities, the authors also suggested a neural network-based intru-
sion detection mechanism. The authors of [16] have noted another vulnerability in
HVAC systems, the inaccurate measurements in the temperature or air flow rate sen-
sors. By exploiting such vulnerability, targeted sensors could produce measurements
that are either below (negative bias) or above (positive bias) the real value of the
measured quantities. Similarly, a wavelet neural work was also suggested and trained
in order to diagnose faulty sensor(s).
In [17], several threats against HVAC systems were defined, including manipulating of
the set points, sensors feeding either a constant false measurement or varying measure-
ments within the bounds of the sensor measurements, or sending harmful commands
93
to the actuators. In the same work, a system model-based detection method was
suggested. Similar to the above mentioned works, in this chapter we will focus on
potential attacks against the temperature sensors of HVAC systems that result in
incorrect measurements. Furthermore, we also suggest countermeasures to reduce the
impacts generated by such attacks.
2. MTD-based countermeasures
Initially, MTD was suggested for applications in the area of computer and network
security [18]. For instance, the authors of [19] proposed an MTD based algorithm
to protect the privacy of IPV6 users by repeatedly changing the addresses belong-
ing to the sender and receiver, and thus, leaving the attacker unable to identify the
two communication hosts. Similarly, the authors of [20] developed an MTD-based
strategy for mutating the IP address to create high chances of unpredictability while
maintaining the original configuration of the address. Also, MTD-based techniques
have been applied in the area of smart grids protection [13, 21, 22], specifically for the
process of state estimation which is critically important to ensure a reliable operation
of the electric grid.
MTD has also been applied in the context of control theory. In [23], the authors im-
plemented an MTD-based mechanism that introduced additional states to the control
system, with time-varying dynamics that can be measured using additional sensors.
These new states are difficult to identify by the attacker, and thus, the latter fails to
design stealthy attacks. Also, the authors of [24] considered Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks on control systems that can cease control commands. To prevent such attacks,
the authors proposed an MTD-based mechanism that randomly switches among mul-
tiple controllers, such that alternate control commands are available to replace the
ceased ones, and the operation of the control system is not disrupted.
Close to our work, the authors of [25] proposed an MTD-based mechanism that ran-
domly switches among multiple LQR controllers or sensors, such that unpredictability
of the control system is increased. The switching is based on maximizing the entropy
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produced and minimizing the control cost. The authors also suggested a detection
mechanism in order to identify the attacked actuating/sensing mode and take it oﬄine.
On the other hand, the authors of [26] used an MTD-based mechanism that randomly
switches between different controllers or sensors. However, the switching is based
upon solving a formulated optimization problem that minimizes the attack impacts.
Similar to the aforementioned works, in this chapter, we also propose MTD-based
countermeasures that aim to reduce the impacts of attacking the temperature sensors
of HVAC systems. Our algorithms randomly switch among the installed sensors, such
that a set of them is selected, and an estimation is obtained for the non-measured
temperatures. The switching in both of our algorithms relies mainly upon minimizing
the deviation in state (temperature) estimation.
4.1.2 Organization
Section 4.2 explains the thermal model derived for the smart building. Section 4.3
explains the formulation of an MPC based controller for temperature tracking. Section 4.4
describes the threat model against temperature sensors of HVAC systems. In Section 4.5,
we discuss the formulation of an optimal state observer, the two suggested MTD based
algorithms, and the simulation results. Conclusions are given in Section 4.6.
4.2 Thermal Model
For the purpose of designing an appropriate controller that achieves certain goals for
HVAC systems, detailed information about the heat dynamics of the building under consid-
eration is needed. Acquiring and employing an accurate building thermal model is helpful
with the decision-making process of the controller, especially if the control strategy is highly
dependent upon a model of the process under control, such as the MPC technique. A ther-
mal model is derived from the physical properties of buildings, e.g., the material used in
the building structure, heat storage and loss in each section of the building, and interaction
between physically connected spaces. Furthermore, disturbances such as outside weather
and the ground temperature are considered as well.
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Fig. 4.1. a) A side view of a two-floor building with two zones on each floor. Ti, for
i = 1, . . . , 4, is the temperature of each zone. b) RC network representation of the building
shown in Fig. 4.1a.
In this chapter, we use the thermal model developed in [27, 28], using the grey-box
approach. In this model, the building is divided into a number of zones, wherein each zone is
represented as an RC electrical circuit. For the simulation results presented in this chapter,
we consider a building with two floors and two zones per floor, as shown in Fig. 4.1a and its
RC equivalent circuit in Fig. 4.1b. In the RC representation of the building, R represents
the thermal conduction between any two connected (neighboring) zones, C represents the
thermal capacity in each zone, Ti is the i
th zone’s measured temperature, and ui is the
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input, calculated by the MPC controller and supplied to the ith zone. Furthermore, this
model also considers the sun temperatures v3 and v4, conducted through the windows to
the 3rd and 4th zones, and the ground temperatures v1 and v2, also conducted to the 1
st
and 2nd zones.
In this study, we assume that each zone in the building is equipped with a Variable
Air-flow Volume (VAV), which is a terminal box that provides conditioned air [29]. The
conditioned air is provided to each zone with a specific air flow rate that can be selected
from multiple predefined discrete levels [30]. Each VAV unit consists of a damper, which
regulates the air flow rate, and a heating coil, to raise the supplied air temperature if needed
[31]. Therefore, the control input u will be calculated using our MPC based controller from
a predefined discrete range, as will be explained in Section 4.3.
By using Nodal analysis, the heat dynamics of each zone in the building can be de-
scribed in first-order differential equations. For example, the heat dynamics of the 1st zone
in Fig. 4.1b can be described as follows
C1T˙1(t) =
1
R1
(v1(t)− T1(t)) + 1
R12
(T2(t)− T1(t)) + 1
R13
(T3(t)− T1(t)) + u1(t) (4.1)
Similarly, the same analysis can be used to write the heat dynamics for the other zones.
As a result, the thermal model of the whole building can be described using the following
state space representation
x˙(t) = Acx(t) +Bcu(t) +Gcw(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(4.2)
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where x ∈ Rn×1, u ∈ Rp×1, w ∈ Rn×1, and y ∈ Rn×1 (with n = p = 4) refer to the state,
input, disturbance, and output vectors, respectively, defined as follows
x(t) =
[
T1(t) T2(t) T3(t) T4(t)
]T
u(t) =
[
i1(t) i2(t) i3(t) i4(t)
]T
w(t) =
[
v1(t) v2(t) v3(t) v4(t)
]T
y(t) =
[
T1(t) T2(t) T3(t) T4(t)
]T
(4.3)
also A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×p, G ∈ Rn×n, and G ∈ Cn×n are system matrices defined as follows
Ac =

−1
C1
( 1R1 +
1
R12
+ 1R13 )
1
C1R12
1
C1R13
0
1
C2R12
−1
C2
( 1R2 +
1
R12
+ 1R24 ) 0
1
C2R24
1
C3R13
0 −1C3 (
1
R3
+ 1R13 +
1
R34
) 1C3R34
0 1C4R24
1
C4R34
−1
C4
( 1R4 +
1
R24
+ 1R34 )

Bc =

1
C1
0 0 0
0 1C2 0 0
0 0 2C3 0
0 0 0 1C4

Gc =

1
C1R1
0 0 0
0 1C2R2 0 0
0 0 2C3R3 0
0 0 0 1C4R4

C =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

(4.4)
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Finally, the model given in (4.2) can be discretized, using the forward difference approxi-
mation [32], into the following discrete-time system (building) model
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) +Gw(k) (4.5)
4.3 Formulating an MPC based Controller for Temperature Tracking
In this section, we will formulate an MPC based controller with the goal to regulate
the temperature at each zone in the building a reference (desired) temperature. For this
purpose, we will consider the model given in (4.4). To ensure an offset-free tracking in the
presence of model uncertainty and unmeasured disturbances, we will add integral action to
the controller. One method for incorporating an integrator in the MPC controller framework
is to modify the plant model such that the input is the control difference ∆u(k), instead of
u(k) [33, 34]. This is achieved by taking the difference of both sides of (4.5) as follows
∆x(k + 1) = A∆x(k) +B∆u(k) +G∆w(k) (4.6)
where
∆x(k) = x(k)− x(k − 1)
∆u(k) = u(k)− u(k − 1)
∆w(k) = w(k)− w(k − 1)
(4.7)
The suggested MPC controller determines ∆u(k) which minimizes the following cost func-
tion
J =
k+N−1∑
l=k
{[
xr(l + 1)− x(l + 1)
]T
Q
[
xr(l + 1)− x(l + 1)
]
+ ∆uT (l)R∆u(l)
}
(4.8)
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where xr ∈ Rn×1 refers to the reference state vector, and Q ∈ Rn×n and R ∈ Rp×p are
weighing matrices. We can rewrite (4.8) as follows
J = (Xr −X)T Q¯(Xr −X) + ∆UT R¯∆U (4.9)
where
Xr =
[
xr(k + 1) xr(k + 2) . . . xr(k +N)
]T
X =
[
x(k + 1) x(k + 2) . . . x(k +N)
]T
∆U =
[
∆u(k) ∆u(k + 1) . . . ∆u(k +N − 1)
]T
(4.10)
from (4.7), we can rewrite ∆x(k) as follows
x(k + 1) = ∆x(k + 1) + x(k) (4.11)
by substituting (4.5) into (4.11), we can write the following
x(k + 1) = ∆x(k + 1) + x(k)
= A∆x(k) +B∆u(k) +G∆w(k) + x(k)
...
x(k +N) = x(k) + (Ak+N +Ak+N−1 + · · ·+A)x(k)
+ (Ak+N−1B + · · ·+B)∆u(k) + . . .
+ (Ak+N−2B + · · ·+B)∆u(k + 1) + . . .
+B∆u(K +N − 1)
+ (Ak+N−1G+ · · ·+G)∆w(k) + . . .
+ (Ak+N−2G+ · · ·+G)∆w(k + 1) + . . .
+G∆w(K +N − 1)
(4.12)
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which can be rewritten in the following compact form
X = M1x(k) +M2∆x(k) +M3∆U +M4∆W (4.13)
where
∆W =
[
∆w(k) ∆w(k + 1) . . . ∆w(k +N − 1)
]T
(4.14)
Matrices Q¯, R¯, M1, M2, M3, and M4 are defined in Appendix C. By substituting (4.13)
into (4.9), we get the following
J = ∆UTHc∆U + fc∆U + other terms (4.15)
where
Hc = M
T
3 Q¯M3
fc = 2
([
xT (k)MT1 + ∆x
T (k)MT2
+ ∆W TMT4 −XTr
]
Q¯M3
) (4.16)
it should be noted that the ”other terms” in (4.15) do not include the term ∆U and, hence,
shall be omitted. Therefore, the MPC controller determines the control sequence ∆U by
solving the following optimization problem
minimize
∆U
J(k) = ∆UTHc∆U + fc∆U (4.17)
the current control input u(k) is determined by using ∆u(k), which is obtained from ∆U ,
and the previous input as follows
u(k) = ∆u(k)− u(k − 1) (4.18)
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Fig. 4.2. a) Temperature profiles of the outside and four zones in a smart building where
our MPC controller is tracking a desired temperature of 25C. b) Measured and reference
temperature profiles of each zone. c) The absolute temperature tracking error of each zone.
d) Control input of each zone.
4.3.1 Results
For the results presented in this section, we used MATLAB to simulate a building
wherein n = 4 and (number of zones) and p = 4 (number of control inputs), using the system
thermal model developed in Section 4.2. The MPC controller regulates the temperature in
each zone to a desired value of 25C and the simulation time is equal to twenty four hours.
Fig. 4.2 shows simulation results using the MPC-based controller to regulate the tem-
perature of four zones inside a building wherein the controller is aiming to keep the tem-
peratures close to or around 25C (desired setting) by providing heating only. For these
results, the simulation time is a one-day period. Fig. 4.2a shows the temperature profiles
of the four zones, the outside of the building, and the reference (desired setting) during the
simulation time. We can see that the controller is able to keep the indoor temperatures
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Fig. 4.3. The control input discrete sequences resulting from using an input energy of a)
1kW, b) 0.5kW, and c) 0.1 kW. d) The absolute temperature tracking error resulting from
using the shown input sequences.
close to the reference. Fig. 4.2c shows the absolute tracking error in the four zones. It
is clear that the controller manages to keep the tracking errors around 1C. However, we
can also see that e3 and e4, the tracking errors of the third and fourth zones, respectively,
exceed 1C, particularly within the time before 12 hours. This is because of the effect of the
outside temperature on the above-mentioned zones. As we can see in Fig. 4.2a, the outside
temperature fluctuates throughout the day, and heat propagates from the outside to the
third and fourth zones. As a result, propagated heat manages to raise the temperature
above the reference. For that reason, the controller does not generate control commands
for those zones during the first 12 hours, as is shown in Fig. 4.2d. Fig. 4.2b shows the
measured and reference temperature profiles in the four zones. We can see in Fig. 4.2d that
the controller generates specific non-zero discrete commands to provide heating specifically
for the time instances when the measured temperature is below the reference.
In Fig. 4.3, we focus on the temperature response of the 1st zone in the building. As
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was explained in Section 4.2, the control input u is selected from predefined discrete levels,
which are obtained as a percentage of a certain energy. Therefore, three values for the input
energy are defined and tested with the proposed MPC controller. Fig. 4.3a, 4.3b, and 4.3c
show the percentage of air mass flow supplied to the 1st zone as a result of using an input
energy of 1kW, 0.5kW, and 0.1KW, respectively. We can see that the input always settles
at a level of 1%, indicating less energy consumed by the controller. However, we can also
see that the time needed to keep the controller turned on becomes less as the predefined
input energy increases. Furthermore, regardless of the discrete levels the controller uses, we
can see in Fig. 4.3d that it is possible to achieve the desired temperature for the 1st zone
with an acceptable absolute tracking error which is less than 2C at the worst.
4.4 Threat Model Against HVAC Systems
Generally, an HVAC system, as a CPS, employs optimal controllers which require the
integrating and managing of various subsystems/functionalities. For instance, communica-
tion protocols are utilized to connect multiple components of the HVAC system and relay
data to the controllers. Also, a diverse network of sensors, such as temperature or air pres-
sure sensors, is installed at different parts of the smart building in order to perceive and
monitor the condition either inside or outside the building. Obtaining accurate measure-
ments from the installed sensors is particularly important in order to ensure both a reliable
operation by the optimal controllers and the generation of correct commands. At the same
time, employing the aforementioned functionalities creates potential vulnerabilities in the
HVAC systems that can be exploited by attackers intending to disrupt the normal (proper)
operation [35]. For example, these attacks could be the exchange of false or modified infor-
mation [36] or the manipulating of sensor-measured values to modify the generated control
commands [37], also referred to as false-data injection attacks.
In the context of CPS security, the operation of HVAC systems in the presence of pos-
sible threats against the interconnection among the system’s components has been studied
[15]. Furthermore, the inaccurate measurements of sensors deployed for HVAC systems has
also been identified as a vulnerability. For instance, the installed sensors may constantly
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feed positive or negative biases, i.e., temperature measurements that are larger or smaller,
respectively, than the real values [16] or the sensors may feed falsified, yet still seemingly
realistic, readings [17]. Therefore, in this chapter, we also consider possible scenarios of at-
tacks intending to manipulate the temperature sensor(s) measurements of HVAC systems,
such that the controllers using those measurements are misled.
To demonstrate the impacts of attacks against HVAC-sensing functionality in our study,
we make the following two assumptions: First, the attacker is capable of targeting one or
multiple sensors installed in a smart building. Second, the mounted attack(s) succeeds
in manipulating the readings of the targeted sensor(s). We consider three possible types
of attacks against HVAC sensors, namely, a negative bias attack, wherein the manipulated
measurement is constant and below the real sensed temperature, a sine-wave attack, wherein
the attacker is injecting within-the-bounds sinusoidal-like data into the targeted sensor(s),
and a random-value attack, wherein the attacker is also injecting within-the-bounds data
into the targeted sensor(s), but such data is randomly selected from the range within the
sensor bounds. To assess the impacts induced by the aforementioned attacks, we will define
and use the following metric
Aimpact =
1
Ta
t0+Ta∑
k=t0
[
x(k)− xr(k)
]T [
x(k)− xr(k)
]
(4.19)
where t0 refers to the initial time instance when the attack begins, Ta is the length of attack
time, and xr is the vector of desired temperature. In short, Aimpact represents the mean
squared error of each zone’s temperature with respect to xr.
Fig. 4.4a shows Aimpact calculated both for an attack-free case, and when targeting one
or multiple temperature sensors with the attacks defined in the legend. Regardless of the
type of attack, it is clear that more severe impacts are induced as the number of targeted
sensors increases. Fig. 4.4b shows the simulated temperature profiles of a specific case of
negative bias attack, wherein the first zone sensor is feeding a constant false reading of 22C.
We can see how the temperature of the first (targeted) zone rises, due to misleading the
controller by the falsified measurement. Furthermore, we can also see the attack impact
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Fig. 4.4. (a) Attack impact (Aimpact) calculated for different attack cases. b) Measured and
reference temperature profiles of four zone in a building where the sensor of the first zone is
targeted with a negative bias attack. c) Control input profiles of the four zones generated
by the MPC controller in response to the attack case given in (b).
on the fourth zone temperature, as it also rises, despite the fact that zone sensor was not
attacked. Fig. 4.4c shows the controller actions for the same attack case. The attack
impact is clearly seen in the control input of the targeted zone, as it is increasing over time,
which indicates a greater energy consumption. For this attack case, Aimpact is found equal
to 149.253.
4.5 MTD-based Algorithms
In order to increase the uncertainty of the attacker’s knowledge about the HVAC system
structure, particularly the operation of the MPC controller, we suggest two MTD algorithms
each of which constantly changes the set of sensors selected to produce an estimation of the
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system states, thereby adding unpredictability to the system, and, as a result, reducing the
impacts of any potential attacks against one or multiple sensors installed in the building.
4.5.1 State estimation using an optimal observer
The goal of employing an MTD-based strategy with the designed MPC controller is
to increase the uncertainty of the attacker’s knowledge about the HVAC system structure,
and, as a consequence, reduce the impacts of potential attacks against the system sensors.
We suggest a way to achieve that goal by constantly changing the set of sensors with
measurements fed to the MPC controller. In the baseline system structure, we assume
that each zone of the smart building is equipped with at least one temperature sensor.
Furthermore, we also assume, in Section 4.4, that one or more of those sensors could be
potentially compromised. Therefore, instead of using measurements from all of them, a
subset of those sensors is selected randomly, and its readings used both to perform state
estimation in order to provide data for the remaining unmeasured temperatures and to use
that data to generate control commands.
State estimation is a process that provides knowledge about system states which cannot
be measured or determined directly on the basis of available sensor measurements, a model
of that system, and previous inputs/outputs. Furthermore, an observer is a circuit block or a
computer software capable of performing the state estimation process. An important factor
to consider when it comes to state estimation is that the available sensor measurements,
along with the system model, can render the system fully observable, which means it is
possible to reconstruct all unmeasured states [38]. As a part of our suggested MTD-based
algorithms, we will utilize the state estimation process to determine the temperatures for
which sensors have not been selected during the implementation of the algorithms. For that
purpose, we will formulate an optimal state observer as follows
1. Formulation of the optimal observer
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Our formulated observer uses previously collected data to estimate the current tem-
peratures. The estimated system dynamics can be described as follows
xˆ(k + 1) = Axˆ(k) +Bu(k) +Gw(k)
yˆ(k) = Cxˆ(k)
(4.20)
where xˆ and yˆ refer to the estimated state and output vectors, respectively. If A is
nonsingular, as is the case with our system model, then we can write
xˆ(k) = A−1xˆ(k + 1)−A−1Bu(k)−A−1Gw(k) (4.21)
using (4.21), we can describe the past state vector over a time horizon N recursively
as follows
xˆ(k − 1) = A−1xˆ(k)−A−1Bu(k − 1)−A−1Gw(k − 1)
...
xˆ(k −N) = A−N xˆ(k)− · · · −A−1Bu(k −N)
+A−NGw(k − 1)− · · · −A−1Gw(k −N)
(4.22)
using (4.22), we can describe the past output vector over N recursively as follows
yˆ(k − 1) = Cxˆ(k − 1)
= CA−1xˆ(k)− CA−1Bu(k − 1)
− CA−1Gw(k − 1)
...
yˆ(k −N) = Cxˆ(k −N)
= CA−N xˆ(k)− · · · − CA−1Bu(k −N)
+ CA−NGw(k − 1)− · · · − CA−1Gw(k −N)
(4.23)
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which can written as follows
Yˆ = A¯xˆ(k) + B¯U + G¯W (4.24)
where
Yˆ =
[
yˆ(k −N) yˆ(k −N + 1) . . . yˆ(k − 1)
]T
U =
[
u(k −N) u(k −N + 1) . . . u(k − 1)
]T
W =
[
w(k −N) w(k −N + 1) . . . w(k − 1)
]T
(4.25)
Matrices A¯, B¯, and G¯ are defined in Appendix C. The squared error between measured
and estimated outputs can be defined as follows
J(k) =
(
Y − Yˆ )T (Y − Yˆ ) (4.26)
where Y is a vector of N collected previous outputs. By substituting (4.24) into (4.29)
we get
J(k) = xˆ(k)Hexˆ(k) + fexˆ(k) (4.27)
where
He = A¯
T A¯
fe = 2
(
[UT B¯T +W T G¯T − Y T ]A¯) (4.28)
In summary, the objective of our formulated optimal state observer is to estimate
the current states (temperatures) vector xˆ(k) by solving the following optimization
problem
minimize
xˆ(k)
J(k) = xˆ(k)Hexˆ(k) + fexˆ(k) (4.29)
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Fig. 4.5. a) Real and estimated temperature profiles using the optimal observer with 200
previous readings from the second zone’s sensor. b) Real and estimated temperature profiles
using the optimal observer with 100 previous readings from the second zone’s sensor. c)
Absolute estimation error for an observer using 100 previous from the second and third
zones’ sensors. d) Absolute estimation error for the results shown in (a). e) Absolute
estimation error for the results shown in (b). f) Absolute estimation error for an observer
using 30 previous from the second, third, and fourth zones’ sensors.
2. Estimation results
Fig. 4.5 shows various simulation results using the optimal observer formulated in
Section 1 and for different cases. Fig. 4.5a shows the results for estimating the
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temperatures of the four zones in the building, whereby the observer is using the
measurements from a single sensor installed in the second zone. For this case, the
number of collected data samples (Ne) is equal to 200. Given that the sampling
frequency is equal to 1/120 Hz, collecting 200 data samples requires about six and
a half hours, which is when the estimation begins (green line) as shown in the same
figure. For the same case, the estimation error, or the absolute difference between
real and estimated temperatures, is shown in Fig. 4.5d. We can see clearly in both
Figures mentioned above that the observer is capable of predicting the temperatures
of the first, third, and fourth zones reliably, where the maximum estimation errors
are equal to 0.421 C, 0.398 C, and 0.135 C, respectively.
Fig. 4.5b and 4.5e show the results for another case, wherein the observer is still
using a single sensor but Ne is equal to 100. For this case, the estimation process
starts earlier, at time equals to 3 hours, when compared to the previous case, as Ne
is smaller. It is clear that the observer does not perform as reliably as it did in the
previous case, particularly with regard to predicting the temperatures of the first and
third zones, wherein the maximum prediction errors are equal to 7.022 C and 5.384
C, respectively. From both cases explained above, we conclude that increasing the
value of Ne helps to improve the performance of the state observer although a bigger
Ne means a longer time is needed for the data collecting process.
Alternatively, we will run the observer in new cases, where in addition to Ne, the
number of installed sensors is varied. Fig. 4.5c shows the estimation error for a case
wherein the observer is using two sensors, installed in the second and third zones, and
Ne is equal to 100. We can see that the observer’s performance is improved when
compared to the case shown in Fig. 4.5b and 4.5e, wherein Ne was also equal to 100.
In fact, it is clear that the prediction of the first and fourth zones’ temperatures, where
no sensors are installed, is nearly equivalent to that of the second and third zones,
where we assumed the presence of sensors, a clear indication of a reliable estimation.
Finally, Fig. 4.5f shows the estimation error for the case wherein the observer is using
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the measurements of three sensors installed in the second, third, and fourth zones, and
Ne is equal to 30. Similar to the previous case, we can see nearly equivalent results
for all predictions, however, with more sensors and fewer collected data samples. In
summary, we conclude from all the cases above that the performance of the formulated
optimal observer improves as the value of Ne increases. Furthermore, we also conclude
that in order to produce a reliable estimation, the observer needs fewer data samples
as the number of installed sensors increases, which, in turn, indicates that a shorter
time is needed to collect those samples.
In order to analyze the robustness of both our MPC-based controller and optimal
observer, we run a number of simulations wherein we assumed the presence of mea-
surement noise and system uncertainty. In these simulations, an MPC-based controller
regulates the temperature in four indoor zones where control commands are generated
using either measurements from each zone’s temperature sensor or estimations from
the optimal observer formulated in Section 4.5.1. Also, for each simulation run, we
calculated the mean absolute temperature tracking error ei (for i = 1,2,3,4) for the
four zones. Depending on the number of measurements used in state estimation, we
color-coded the results for using one, two, three, and four sensors with brown, green,
yellow, and blue, respectively.
Table 4.1 shows the values of ei calculated for the four zones wherein measurements
Table 4.1. Mean absolute tracking error ei (for i = 1,2,3,4) calculated with measurements
noise of zero mean and the variance shown in the leftmost column. Brown, green, yellow,
and blue colored cells indicate state estimation calculated using measurements from one,
two, three, and four sensors, respectively.
using sensor measurements using estimated state vector xˆ
e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4
20%
0.524 0.391 0.565 0.343 0.226 0.213 0.274 0.194 0.344 0.316 0.322 0.301
0.207 0.162 0.199 0.181 0.236 0.211 0.329 0.196
40%
1.519 1.311 1.942 1.761 0.238 0.216 0.294 0.237 0.351 0.317 0.320 0.325
0.214 0.201 0.215 0.209 0.321 0.214 0.324 0.214
60%
2.411 2.623 3.052 3.098 0.343 0.311 0.305 0.285 0.348 0.328 0.347 0.361
0.306 0.293 0.240 0.224 0.325 0.291 0.336 0.237
80%
3.746 3.730 3.849 3.992 0.402 0.358 0.363 0.348 0.364 0.342 0.421 0.405
0.369 0.362 0.341 0.346 0.349 0.327 0.344 0.347
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are susceptible to zero mean noise and the variance shown in the leftmost column.
We can see that the controller performs well, with noise variance equal to or below
20%, and wherein temperature tracking is achieved with ei values close to or below
0.5C. However, we can also see that the performance of the controller worsens as the
variance increases above 20%, as the values of ei are also increasing. On the other
hand, it is clear that the use of the estimated state vector xˆ with the MPC-based
controller improves results, regardless of the number of sensors used for estimation,
since all values of ei are close to or below 0.4C. Furthermore, it is also clear that
employing more sensor reading for estimations improves the temperature tracking by
reducing the value of ei.
Table 4.2 shows the values of ei calculated for the four zones wherein we assumed that
the system matrix A, which is used to simulate the thermal dynamics of the building,
has uncertainty. That is, the matrix A is perturbed by random values as follows
Anew = A+ β. ∗A (4.30)
where β ∈ Rn×n is a matrix containing random uniformly distributed numbers gen-
erated within the ranges shown in the leftmost column of Table 4.2. Whether using
direct measurements or an estimation, we can see that the controller is performing
well with system uncertainty for the cases corresponding to the range of (±10%) or
below. Similarly, the same pattern is exhibited when using xˆ, as the values of ei are
Table 4.2. Mean absolute tracking error ei calculated with system uncertainty where
matrix A is perturbed with random values selected from within the ranges shown in the
leftmost column. Cell colors are defined similarly as in Table 4.1.
using sensor measurements using estimated state vector xˆ
e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4
±2% 0.297 0.209 0.375 0.355 0.368 0.225 0.223 0.251 0.385 0.346 0.374 0.326
0.220 0.213 0.239 0.230 0.357 0.317 0.325 0.341
±6% 0.233 0.241 0.476 0.543 0.676 0.439 0.328 0.361 0.520 0.386 0.382 0.375
0.364 0.356 0.313 0.352 0.391 0.404 0.382 0.389
±10% 0.491 0.482 0.507 0.556 0.791 0.510 0.496 0.426 0.612 0.474 0.545 0.527
0.463 0.421 0.424 0.411 0.459 0.461 0.536 0.425
±30% 2.305 1.249 2.203 1.791 2.114 1.629 1.531 1.197 2.252 2.159 1.765 1.173
0.948 0.957 0.871 0.855 1.221 1.127 1.046 1.135
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reduced, and employing more sensors for the state estimation process improves the
temperature tracking.
4.5.2 First MTD based algorithm (MTD1)
In order to understand the main idea behind this algorithm, we will begin with a case
study. We will consider a building with four zones where a single temperature sensor is
installed in each zone. Therefore, the following combinations of sensor sets can render the
system fully observable and, hence, will be used in the state estimation process
sensor ={s1, s2, s3, s4}
sensor set ={s4, s3, s3s4, s2, s2s4, s2s3,
s2s3s4, s1, s1s4, s1s3, s1s3s4,
s1s2, s1s2s4, s1s2s3}
(4.31)
where si is the sensor installed in the i
th zone. Each one of those sets can be obtained using
the corresponding row(s) of the output matrix C. For this particular case, we will assume
that the second sensor s2 was targeted with a negative bias attack. Therefore, the sensor
set given in (4.31) will contain intact sets, which include s2, and flawed sets, which do not
include s2. As a first step of this algorithm, the following cost function J is calculated for
each set given in (4.31)
Ji(k) =
[
yi(k)− Cixˆi(k)
]T
Qyi
[
yi(k)− Cixˆi(k)
]
for i = 1, . . . , |sensor set|
(4.32)
where Ci is the row(s) of output matrix C that result in the output vector yi, and Qyi
is a weighing matrix. Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the calculated values of J for both the
intact and flawed sets, given in (4.31), respectively. For both those figure, the MTD based
algorithm is engaged at the same time with the optimal observer, which is almost at time
114
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
time [hour]
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
co
st
 fu
nc
tio
n
J1
J2
J3
J8
J9
J10
J11
(a)
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
time [hour]
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
co
st
 fu
nc
tio
n
J4
J5
J6
J7
J12
J13
J14
(b)
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
time [hour]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
tra
ck
in
g 
er
ro
r [C
]
e1
e2
e3
e4
(c)
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
time [hour]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
e
st
im
at
io
n 
er
ro
r [C
]
e1
e2
e3
e4
(d)
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
time [hour]
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
in
de
x 
of
 s
el
ec
te
d 
se
ns
or
 s
et
(e)
Fig. 4.6. a) Cost function (J) calculated, using (4.32), for the intact sensor sets. b) Cost
function (J) calculated for the flawed sensor sets. c) Absolute temperature tracking error
when the MPC controller is using measurements selected by the MTD based algorithm. d)
Absolute temperature estimation error when the observer is using measurements selected by
the MTD based algorithm. e) Indices of sensor sets selected by the MTD based algorithm.
equal to 6.6 hours. We can see clearly that intact sets produce smaller values for J compared
to those produced by the flawed sets. This is an expected behaviour due to the presence
of a manipulated measurement from s2 which, in turn, will induce an estimated vector xˆ
deviating from the actual measurements vector y. As a result, we have an indication of
an attacked (manipulated) measurement although we cannot define exactly which sensor is
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Algorithm 3: First MTD based defense (MTD1)
Input: a combination of sensor sets along with their measurement yi vectors, for
i = 1, . . . , |sensor sets|.
Output: a randomly selected estimated state vector xˆr, where
1 ≤ r ≤ |sensor set|.
1 for i = 1 : |sensor set| do
2 determine xˆi using the optimal observer and yi ;
3 Ji ←
[
yi − Cixˆi
]T
Qyi
[
yi − Cixˆi
]
;
4 arrange Ji in an ascending order;
5 randomly select a Jr from the first half of the ascending arrangement;
6 xˆr ← the estimated state vector corresponding to Jr;
giving that measurement. Therefore, we will benefit from this attack indication in suggesting
our first MTD based algorithm whose steps are as follows
1. At the current time step k, use the optimal observer to determine xˆi(k) for each sensor
set.
2. Calculate Ji(k) using (4.32) for each sensor set. Then, arrange Ji(k) in an ascending
order.
3. Out of the first half of the ascending arrangement, randomly select a Jr(k), where
1 ≤ r ≤ |sensor set|.
4. Use the estimated state vector xˆr(k), obtained using the measurements provided by
the rth set, in the MPC controller to determine u(k).
5. For the next time step k + 1, collect measurements from the sensors and go to step
(1).
The steps for our first MTD based defense approach are shown in Algorithm 3. For
the same attack scenario against s2, Figure 4.6c shows the absolute temperature tracking
error when the MPC controller is employing measurements selected by the above explained
algorithm. Similarly, Figure 4.6d shows the absolute temperature estimation error when the
optimal observer is employing measurements selected by the above explained algorithm. In
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addition, Figure 4.6e shows the indices of selected sets which belong to the following range
(1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11). We can see that the algorithm selects only one of the intact set, whose
indices are shown in the legend of Figure 4.6a, which indicates the success of our MTD
based approach to deter the attack mounted against s2.
Since increasing the number of targeted sensors will reduce the number of intact sets,
this algorithm can fail to reduce the impacts of multi sensor attacks. One possible remedy
for this drawback is to increase the number of installed temperature sensors in the building.
Another possible remedy is to modify the algorithm, which leads us to suggesting another
MTD based algorithm in the next section.
4.5.3 Second MTD based algorithm (MTD2)
In this section, we suggest another MTD based algorithm with the goal to overcome
the shortcomings of the first algorithm. For this algorithm, we also will use the same sensor
sets given in (4.31) which make the system fully observable. In order to understand the
idea behind this algorithm, we will also consider the same case study from the previous
section. By examining Fig. 4.6a, we can see that the cost function J of the intact sets
does not exactly reach zero, which is expected since we have inherent measurement noise.
We will benefit from that Figure in selecting a threshold value, which we will refer to as 
henceforth, and use it in our second MTD based algorithm whose steps are as follows
1. Initially, define  > 0 by making use of Fig. 4.6a.  should be a value where at each
time step, one or multiple J , of intact sets, is equal to or smaller than.
2. At the current time step k, randomly select two sensor sets.
3. use the optimal observer to determine xˆ1(k) and xˆ2(k) for the selected sets.
4. Calculate the modified cost function for each selected set as follows
Ji(k) =
1
|k − k0|
k∑
l=k0
{ [
yi(l)− Cixˆi(l)
]T
Qyi
[
yi(l)− Cixˆi(l)
]}
(4.33)
where k0 is the index of the initial time step, and i = 1, 2.
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5. If the following is true
J1(k) ≤  and J2(k) ≤  (4.34)
then select either one of the sets Jr, where r ∈ {1, 2}, and go to step (9).
6. Else if the following is true
J1(k) >  and J2(k) ≤  (4.35)
then, ignore J1(k) along with its sensor set. Select another set randomly and go to
step (3).
7. Else if the following is true
J1(k) ≤  and J2(k) >  (4.36)
then, ignore J2(k) along with its sensor set. Select another set randomly and go to
step (3).
8. Else, ignore both sets. Select another two sets randomly and go to step (3).
9. Use the estimated state vector xˆr(k), obtained in step (3), in the MPC controller to
determine u(k).
10. For the next time step k + 1, go to step (2).
The steps for our second MTD based defense approach are shown in Algorithm 4.
Results for using this algorithm and a performance comparison, with respect to the previous
algorithm, are given in the next section.
4.5.4 Performance evaluation for the MTD-based algorithms
In order to show the efficacy of the two suggested defenses, we will evaluate the per-
formance of the two MTD-based algorithms with the designed MPC controller when one or
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Algorithm 4: Second MTD based defense (MTD2)
Input: a combination of sensor sets along with their measurement yi vectors, for
i = 1, . . . , |sensor sets|, a threshold value  > 0, initial and current time
steps k0 and k.
Output: a randomly selected estimated state vector xˆr, where
1 ≤ r ≤ |sensor set|.
1 randomly select two sensor sets y1 and y2 ;
2 BreakFlag ← 0 ;
3 while BreakFlag = 0 do
4 for i = 1 : 2 do
5 determine xˆi using the optimal observer and yi ;
6 Ji ← equation (4.33) ;
7 if (J1 ≤  and J2 ≤ ) then
8 Jr ← either J1 or J2 ;
9 BreakFlag ← 1 ;
10 else if (J1 >  and J2 ≤ ) then
11 ignore J1 and y1 ;
12 J1 ← randomly select another set ;
13 else if (J1 ≤  and J2 > ) then
14 ignore J2 and y2 ;
15 J2 ← randomly select another set ;
16 else
17 ignore J1, J2, y1, and y2 ;
18 J1 ← randomly select another set ;
19 J2 ← randomly select another set ;
20 xˆr ← the estimated state vector corresponding to Jr ;
multiple sensors are compromised. In our evaluation, we consider a building with four zones
that utilizes an MPC controller. The MPC controller inputs are the measurements provided
from four temperature sensors, one installed per each zone. In this case, the four sensors
form a total of 14 sensor sets wherein each one can be used for the state estimation process.
We also assume that all the installed sensors are susceptible to the three types of attacks
defined in the threat model. Furthermore, in our evaluation, we include the results for a
baseline scenario in which the MPC controller operates without any of the MTD defenses,
and also attack-free scenarios in which the MPC controller operates with either of the two
defenses, though the sensors are not compromised.
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Fig. 4.7. A comparison for using the suggested MTD based algorithms to reduce Aimpact
generated by the following attacks: a) negative bias, b) sinusoidal, and c) random. d)
Number of selected sensor sets by the two MTD based algorithms and for different cases of
random attack. For all these results, we assume that four temperature sensors are installed
in the building.
Fig. 4.7a shows the attack impact Aimpact for varying cases with respect to the applica-
tion of the MTD-based algorithms and the number of sensors targeted by a constant-value
attack. In this Figure, we can see that both MTD-based algorithms manage to deter the
above-mentioned attack, targeting only a single sensor in the building, for which the result-
ing Aimpact is nearly equivalent with respect to each attack and to that resulting from the
attack-free cases. However, for cases involving multiple-sensor attacks, we can see clearly
that MTD1 fails when it comes to attack cases targeting 2 (50%) or more of the installed
sensors. On the other hand, MTD2 produces values for Aimpact for attack cases involving
up to 3 (75%) of the sensors equivalent to those produced by the attack-free cases, and this
algorithm fails only with attacks targeting all of the sensors, which, in turn, increases the
cost of the mounted attacks.
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Fig. 4.7b shows Aimpact under different cases involving a sinusoidal attack. Similar to
the previous attack case, we see the same performance by the two MTD-based algorithms.
We can also draw the same conclusion from Fig. 4.7c, which shows the results for cases
of random attack. In general, we can see from the results depicted in Fig. 4.7 that both
algorithms achieve the main goal of MTD, which is to create a proactive defense by adding
uncertainty to the control structure employed by the smart building, using the potentially
attacked sensors, and, hence, reducing the attack space, even though one of the algorithms
outperforms the other.
For MTD1, the algorithm relies on the values of performance indices, calculated using
(4.32) without considering how significantly big or small those values are. For that reason
and also because of the limited number of sensor sets, we see that that algorithm fails to
deter attacks against multiple sensors. On the other hand, the MTD2 algorithm relies on
the performance indices, calculated using (4.33), as well as the predefined threshold . This
reliance allows the algorithm to search for the intact sensor sets and randomly select one of
them. As a result, it is clear from Fig. 4.7a, 4.7b, and 4.7c that MTD2 fails only when all
(100%) of the sensors are attacked, resulting in the unavailability of intact sets. Fig. 4.7d
shows the number of selected sets by both MTD-based algorithms for the different cases of
random attack depicted in Fig. 4.7c. We can see clearly how MTD tends to select fewer
numbers of sets as the number of attacked sensors increases, meaning that the number of
intact sets decreases.
Alternatively, we will evaluate the performance of the suggested algorithms with a
redundancy of sensors. More specifically, we will consider a four-zoned smart building with
an MPC controller whose inputs are the measurements from eight temperature sensors, two
installed per each zone. In this case, the eight sensors provide a total of 64 sensor sets, each
of which can be used for the state estimation process. Fig. 4.8a, 4.8b, and 4.8c show Aimpact
with the application of the MTD-based algorithms with sensors redundancy, for different
cases of constant-value, sinusoidal, and random attacks, respectively, mounted against one
or multiple sensors. In all the aforementioned figures, we can see that MTD2 exhibits
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Fig. 4.8. A comparison for using the suggested MTD based algorithms to reduce Aimpact
generated by the following attacks: a) negative bias, b) sinusoidal, and c) random. d)
Number of selected sensor sets by the two MTD based algorithms and for different cases of
random attack. For all these results, we assume that eight temperature sensors are installed
in the building.
the same performance, in that it fails only when all the equipped sensors are attacked.
Furthermore, in Fig. 4.8d, which shows the number of selected sets for different cases of
random attack, MTD2 selects sets in a descending order as the number of attacked sensors
grows, which, in turns, reduces the attack window.
Fig. 4.8a and 4.8b show that the performance of MTD1 is improved with sensor re-
dundancy, as the algorithm fails when 75% and 87.5% of the installed sensors are attacked,
respectively. However, we can see in Fig. 4.8c that MTD1 fails after 50% of the sensors are
attacked. This drawback could be solved by adding more sensors to the system structure,
and, as a result, creating more sensor sets. In summary, the suggested MTD-based algo-
rithms are able to reduce the impacts of attacks mounted against the temperature sensors.
On one hand, MTD1 requires sensor redundancy in order to be able to deter multiple-sensor
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attack cases. On the other hand, MTD2 does not need more than one sensor per zone as
long as the resulting sensor sets make the system observable. Furthermore, MTD2 only
fails when all sensors are attacked. However, it should be noted that implementing MTD2
requires a number of oﬄine system simulations to calculate the cost functions, shown in
Fig. 4.6a and 4.6b, in order to select an appropriate value for .
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered the HVAC systems which are employed in residential
and commercial smart buildings to provide thermal comfort for the occupants. First, we
formulated an MPC based controller with the goal of tracking a desired temperature for
each zone in the building. Then, we analyzed the impacts that could result from target-
ing (attacking) the temperature sensors, with readings used by the MPC-based controller,
by manipulating their measurements. Such deliberate actions could lead to deceiving the
controller, and, hence, cause discomfort for the occupants. For that reason, we suggested
two MTD-based algorithms, with the goal of reducing the impacts of such attacks. Our
suggested algorithms constantly change the sensor set with readings fed to the controller
and also estimate the other non-measured temperatures. The results showed an improve-
ment in the performance of the MPC-based controller if combined with either one of the
algorithms, in terms of providing an acceptable temperature tracking despite the presence
of sensor attacks.
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CHAPTER 5
ATTACK MITIGATION IN ADVERSARIAL PLATOONING USING
DETECTION-BASED SLIDING MODE CONTROL AND SWITCHING OF CONTROL
FROM AUTO TO HUMAN
In this chapter, we study the behavior of a single vehicular platoon where one of the
platooned vehicles is controlled by an attacker. The latter is able to modify the platooning
controller of the seized vehicle and, hence, produce sudden accelerating/decelerating move-
ments that can lead to collisions inside the platoon. A previous study suggested a sliding
mode controller which uses only local vehicular sensor information without the need for
inter-vehicle communications, to mitigate the impacts of the aforementioned attack. Also,
the suggested controller is assisted with a decentralized attack detection. Simulation re-
sults from that study demonstrate that collisions are eliminated, or significantly reduced
at certain cases. However, the same results also indicate that the intact vehicles concede
platooning and start following the attacker. For instance, the lead vehicle, assuming not
being attacked, will no longer follow a reference trajectory, which is part of its platooning
goals, once it detects an attack behind it. Therefore, we will modify the suggested mitiga-
tion controller such that the collisions are also reduced and the control of intact vehicles
will eventually switch from auto to human driving, i.e., disband the platoon, such that the
attacker cannot have an influence on them anymore.
5.1 Introduction
The formation and maintaining of automated vehicular platoons is an area of exten-
sive and ongoing research. Platooning has been shown to have environmental, safety, and
passenger comfort benefits [1, 2]. They also help to alleviate traffic congestion on highways
[3] and have proven more fuel efficient than manually-operated vehicles [4]. The safety and
security of a platooning CPS is important and essential. For a platooning CPS, it has been
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shown that a single attacker can disrupt normal operations simply and easily, and that
such disruptions can cause catastrophic collisions [5]. For that reason, a previous study [6]
proposed a sliding mode controller aimed at ensuring that the impacts induced as a result of
the attack presented in [5] would be mitigated. More specifically, a sliding mode controller
was formulated with the goal of ensuring that deviations from expected platoon behavior
due to the aforementioned attack would not cause collisions.
In this chapter, our work builds upon the results presented in [6] and also attempts
to solve the safety problem of an adversarial environment. The results of the aforemen-
tioned work indicated that the proposed sliding mode controller was able to considerably
eliminate, or at least significantly educe, accidents. However, though the engagement of
the proposed controller resulted in a collision-free platoon, said platoon was still influenced
by the attacker-controlled vehicle. For that reason, we modify the proposed sliding mode
controller such that it is still able to avoid collisions and, at the same time, lead the way to
disbanding, which is switching control from auto to humans.
5.1.1 Related work
Sliding Mode Control has been used previously in many scenarios. Platooning strate-
gies exist where sliding mode control has been used in a homogeneous platoon [7] under
normal operation. Graph theoretic approaches similar to ours have been used before in
platooning [8, 9], and in general problems of multiple vehicle target tracking in the presence
of uncertainties [10].
Apart from platooning, much work has been completed in interconnected dynamic
cyber-physical systems. The security and robustness of these systems in the face of an attack
or failure is crucial and an active area of research [11]. Graph theory and information flow
analysis have been used to analyze such systems as well [8, 9]. Much of this work focused on
ensuring suitable operating conditions for dynamic systems, with an emphasis on stability,
controllability, and observability.
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5.1.2 Organization
Section 5.2 explains the platooning, vehicle, and threat models used in simulations for
this chapter. In Section 5.3, we present the sliding mode controller and its modification for
attacks mitigation. Section 5.4 discusses the simulation results. Conclusions are given in
Section 5.5.
5.2 System Model
In this section, we discuss the vehicle, platooning, and threat models used for simula-
tions of this chapter.
5.2.1 Platooning Model
In keeping with the current literature [12, 13], each vehicle is analyzed as a double in-
tegrator system, where the control input is a desired acceleration. For an n-vehicle platoon,
the state vector x ∈ R2n is made up of positions and velocities and the input vector u ∈ Rn
consists of control inputs. The state and input vectors can be expressed as
x =
[
x1 x2 . . . xn v1 v2 . . . vn
]T
u =
[
u1 u2 . . . un
]T (5.1)
and the state space system becomes
x˙ =
0n×n In×n
0n×n 0n×n
x+
0n×n
In×n
u (5.2)
where car i has position and velocity xi, vi, respectively, and control input ui. These po-
sitions are measured from the center of mass of all the cars. In the bidirectional control
scheme, we have
ui = fi(xi−1 − xi, vi−1 − vi, xi+1 − xi, vi+1 − vi) (5.3)
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States
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vier, ef
(a) Controllers of a single vehicle.
Traditional
Controller
Mitigation
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Attack
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ui
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er, ef
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(b) Inside high level controller: attack detection and controller selection based on
attack state.
Fig. 5.1. Overview of Platoon. Each vehicle knows its own velocity and measures a relative
distance and velocity from rear and front (er, ef ). These same measurements are used in
the high level controller to switch between rear or front tracking if an attack is detected [6].
which means that each vehicle’s control input can only use relative distance and speed
measurements, obtained using the local range and range rate sensors, respectively, with
respect to its immediate neighbors. This function fi constitutes a high level controller that
is meant to be independent of a vehicle’s dynamics (Fig. 5.1b); as such the control input
ui serves as the vehicles desired acceleration.
As the rearmost and leader vehicle lack a follower and predecessor, respectively, they
follow a slightly modified version of (5.3) wherein the rearmost car uses a unidirectional
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law, and the leader follows a reference trajectory while maintaining a follower separation
u1 = f1(xi+1 − xi, vi+1 − vi)
un = fn(xi−1 − xi, vi−1 − vi, xref − xi, vref − vi)
(5.4)
5.2.2 Vehicle Model
A realistic model of a vehicle has a throttle input or some other type of actuator. The
purpose of this section is to find how a desired acceleration can be achieved based on our
knowledge of the vehicle. A model of the vehicle’s dynamics is required in this case. This
can be specific to different vehicles, but the general idea is to find an expression for the
control input required for a desired acceleration. This constitutes the low level controller
shown in Fig. 5.1a.
The vehicle model we use is a 2nd order plant with a linear friction/drag coefficient.
Such models are easy to analyze while capturing the major dynamics of the system. Similar
models have been used in other control systems literature to analyze fundamental properties
of single vehicles and platoons [14, 15]
x˙i = vi
v˙i = αFi − βvi
(5.5)
where Fi ∈ [F−, F+] is a variable to set the actuator (throttle) and α, β are the model’s
parameters which can be chosen based on the vehicle’s internal design values or through
system modeling [12].
For the high level controller described in (5.3) to work, we need to compensate for the
internal dynamics of the vehicle. We use feedback linearization [12, 15] to compensate for
terms in the model described by (5.5) gives us
Fi =
1
α
(ui + βvi) (5.6)
Note that this controller does require a velocity measurement of vehicle i. A sensor which
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provides this reading will be required, but this is just car sensing its internal data and does
not violate the decentralized condition.
The reason for including this model is to emphasize that there are bounds F−, F+ on Fi
which lead to saturation. We simulate with these saturation limits in order to demonstrate
our controller on a realistic system where the desired acceleration cannot always be achieved.
A favorable consequence of this is that we cannot achieve infinite acceleration.
Substituting (5.6) into (5.5) gives us the required double integrator type system for
each vehicle
x˙i = vi
v˙i = ui
(5.7)
as long as the condition 1α (ui + βvi) ∈ [F−, F+] holds true. These saturation constraints
apply to the attacker as well and ensure that we do not have a car with unrealistic capabil-
ities.
We also add another constraint on this controller which prohibits reverse motion. This
is to maintain relevance with the real application of AHS. It can be expressed as Fi > F
−
i
if (vi > 0) and Fi > 0 otherwise, which means that if a vehicle’s speed is zero or below, it
cannot apply negative actuator input.
5.2.3 Threat Model
For this chapter, we consider a platoon of n members, each equipped with front- and
rear-facing sensors that measure relative distance and velocity. Aside from the attacker-
controlled vehicle, each of the vehicles adheres to the same control law and has the same
capabilities, as described in the previous section (5.2.2). The last member is indexed as 1
and the leader is at index n. We focus on the bidirectional platoon scheme [16], wherein
every car gathers information (e.g. relative distance and speed) about, and reacts to the
movements of, both the preceding and following vehicle. The leader attempts to maintain
a separation with its follower and has access to a reference trajectory. The last car only
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Fig. 5.2. Oscillatory behavior brought on by an attacker, resulting in a high speed crash
[5]. Each line represents the trajectory of a vehicle in a ten vehicle platoon with an attacker
at the rear.
tracks the car immediately in front of it.
We assume just a single attacker in control of a car at an arbitrary position in the
platoon. The attack car is possibly more powerful than the regular cars, in that it may have
greater acceleration capabilities. The goal of the attacker is to cause multiple collisions. To
accomplish this, the attacker follows a modified control law that induces oscillations in the
platoon (Fig. 5.2). It has b en shown that a attacker can leverage oscillat ry behavior to
cause more accumulated damage, and more collisions over time, than if he simply accelerates
in one direction. This can be achieved simply by changing the controller gains [5]. The
attack always begins in a steady state configuration, when the cars are traveling at their
desired epara ns, which was chosen to b one car length of s paration in our tests.
If we limit our discussion to a single attacker, we propose to use the consensus condition
that is required in both cases anyway. We recommend a secondary controller that attempts
to keep a constant distance from the more dangerous and uncooperative car (in front or
behind), relying instead on he other car to move and m ke room. Under normal circum-
stances, a traditional bidirectional law is followed; however, upon detection of anomalous
behavior indicating the onset of an attack, this secondar controller is engaged to mitigate
the attack (Fig. 5.1b). This approach allows a straightforward, ultimate boundedness anal-
ysis, and simulation results show that it greatly re uces total damage when compared with
a bidirectional scheme.
Since total or instantaneous damage is not formally defined, we propose to use a metric
that depends upon two things: whether an impact takes place and the relative velocity of
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the colliding vehicles. The choice of measuring damage is motivated by previous work on
automated vehicle and platooning safety [17, 18]. To measure the accumulation of damage,
we assign the following as a rate of change to a state D:
D˙ = cT vrel (5.8)
where c is an n− 1 length vector whose entries are 0 normally, but 1 if there is a collision.
vrel is a vector containing the absolute values of n−1 relative velocities at time of collision.
5.3 Attack Mitigation
In [6], two sliding mode controllers were designed for the front and rear of each pla-
tooned vehicle. Then, the two controllers were combined using the graph theory [10].
Furthermore, a detection scheme was also suggested to detect possible attacks with respect
to the front and rear of each platooned vehicle. The final form of one of the controllers,
front or rear, is as follows
ui = sat
(s

)
[2k1vmax + amax + ] (5.9)
with
s = k1e1 + e2
e1 = xi+1 − xi − σref
e2 = vi+1 − vi
(5.10)
and
sat
(s

)
=

s
 , if
∥∥ s

∥∥ < 1
sgn
(
s

)
, otherwise
(5.11)
where e1 and e2 are the position and speed errors, σref is the inter-vehicle desired separation,
and k1,  > 1.
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Fig. 5.3. Inter-vehicle separations, vehicular positions, and damage data with an attacker-
controlled vehicle at position 3 in the platoon. Results shown in (a), (c), and (e) are
obtained using the suggested mitigation controller without detection. Results shown in (b),
(d), and (f) are obtained using the suggested mitigation controller with detection.
Table 5.1. Simulation Parameters
Vehicle Dynamics
Controller Detection Filter
normal attacker
F+i = 1 F
+
i = 1 k1 = 0.1 l1 = 200
β = 0.1 β = 0.1  = 0.025 l2 = 600
α = 5 αatt ≥ 5 fcutoff = 0.01 Hz
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To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we consider a five-vehicle platoon
with the attacker at position three. The attacker vehicle follows a square-wave acceleration
pattern, wherein the attacker applies maximum control effort followed by minimum control
effort, with a given frequency fatt. Our platooning goals stipulate σref = 9 m and vref = 25
ms-1, for which each car length l = 4.5 m (one car length of separation between cars). The
parameters in the dynamic model of the cars, controller, and detection filter are given in
Table 5.1. In order to increase attacker power, αatt was chosen to be greater than α. This
is equivalent to having a more powerful engine. Consequently the maximum acceleration
and velocity of the attacker will be equal or higher than those of normal vehicles. Also, we
assume that the third vehicle in the platoon is controlled by the attacker.
Figure 5.3 shows the results for an attack case wherein the attacker is of equal power
to other vehicles in the platoon (αatt = α). We can see clearly that despite the fact that the
mitigation controller was used, the damage increased with time, as shown in Fig. 5.3a, 5.3c,
and 5.3e, while, on the other hand, engaging the same mitigation controller with detection
significantly reduced the accumulated damage, as shown in Fig. 5.3b, 5.3d, and 5.3f.
Despite the ability of our first mitigation controller to significantly reduce collisions,
as shown in Fig. 5.3, it should be noted that the leader gives up the reference trajectory
once it detects the attacker behind it. That is to say, the platooning is abandoned and
the leader, in addition to other followers, are influenced by the attacker-controlled vehicle
which, in turn, act as the new reference for the platoon. For that reason, we will modify our
suggested mitigation controller in order to avoid that undesirable effect. By engaging our
second suggested mitigation, the goal is to gradually increase the inter-vehicle separations
until it is possible to switch control of intact vehicles from auto to human drivers and
effectively disband the platoon. The first step to this mitigation approach is adjusting the
value of amax used to calculate the commanded acceleration in (5.9) which is modified as
follows
ui = sat
(s

)
[2k1vmax + am + ] (5.12)
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Position error (ei)
Speed error (e˙i)
r1r2r3r4
sliding surface
n3 × amax
n2 × amax
n1 × amax
amax
Fig. 5.4. The position - speed errors state space diagram which is employed for our second
mitigation controller. Depending on the current values of both errors, the value of am, used
in (5.12), is modified as nj × amax (j = 1, 2, 3), where (0 < n3 < n2 < n1 < 1). The radii of
concentric circles are determined as given in (5.13).
For that purpose, we will use the state space diagram shown in Fig. 5.4, which shows
the position-speed errors for the ith platooned vehicle, to determine the value of am. The
diagram also includes the sliding surface used by the fist mitigation controller. Depending
upon the value of σref , a number of concentric circles are added to the diagram, their radii
are defined as follows
r1 = n3 × σref
r2 = n2 × σref
r3 = n1 × σref
r4 = σref
(5.13)
where
0 < n3 < n2 < n1 < 1 (5.14)
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Fig. 5.5. Inter-vehicle separations, vehicular positions, and damage data with an attacker-
controlled vehicle at position 3 in the platoon. These results are obtained using the second
suggested mitigation controller with detection.
At each time step, the values of ei(t) and e˙i(t) are calculated. Then, am is equal to
n3 × amax, n2 × amax, n1 × amax, or amax if (ei(t), e˙i(t)) lie inside the circle with radius
r1, r2, r3, or r4, respectively. The second step of this mitigation approach is to gradually
increase the inter-vehicle separations until it is safe for the non-attacked vehicles to switch
control from auto to human driving and thus disband the platoon, which means the latter
vehicles are no longer controlled by the attacker. Also, at each time step, the position error
ei(t) is determined, and if it lies inside the inner circle, which circle’s radius is equal to
r1, then the desired inter-vehicle separation increase by 0.5 m. The last action is repeated
until the inter-vehicle separation reaches a certain predefined threshold, at which point
the disbanding process begins. Fig. 5.5 shows the results for using the second mitigation
controller, with which the disbanding begins once the inter-vehicle separation is increased
by two meter. We can see that the damage is further reduced, compared with the results
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Fig. 5.6. Total damage across relative attacker power and frequencies calculated for a
platoon using bidirectional controller without attack detection. Collision line in green [6].
from Fig. 5.3, and the fourth and fifth vehicles do not follow the attacker anymore; they
attempt, instead, to recover to the reference trajectory.
5.4 Results Comparison
In this section, we compare the results obtained using linear bidirectional controller,
sliding mode controller, and the modified sliding mode controller. In all the results shown in
this section, we simulate a platoon with five vehicles, wherein the attacker is controlling the
third vehicle. To calculate the effect of an attack, we assign a damage state to the platoon
along the lines of 5.8. This damage state begins with a value of zero, and all the collisions’
relative velocities are accumulated as the simulation progresses and cars collide. We also
define a ‘collision line’ as follows: Given an attacking and a defending vehicle along with
some initial conditions, with both applying maximum effort, it is possible to calculateb the
time they collide (tcol) using the solution to (xi+1(t) − xi(t) = 0) and (fcol = 12tcol ), which
is a function of relative attacker power and initial conditions [6]. Above this frequency we
can avoid collisions if a suitable control scheme is adopted. In all the results shown in this
section, the accumulated damage is calculated across a range of frequencies and a range
of relative attacker power. The numbers on the x-axis correspond to the attack frequency
while the numbers on the y-axis correspond to the ratio of attacker power over normal
vehicle power.
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Fig. 5.7. Total damage across relative attacker power and frequencies calculated for a
platoon using sliding mode controller without attack detection. Collision line in green [6].
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Fig. 5.8. Total damage across relative attacker power and frequencies calculated for a
platoon using sliding mode controller with attack detection. Collision line in green [6].
For a reference, we start with total damage measurement using a bidirectional platoon-
ing control law, for which the results are shown in Fig. 5.6. The high level controller for
this case is described as follows
ui = kp(xi+1 − xi − σref) + kp(xi−1 − xi + σref)+
kd(vi+1 − vi) + kd(vi−1 − vi) (5.15)
with kp = 1 and kd = 3. Fig. 5.6 and 5.7 show the total damage calculated for a platoon
using the bidirectional and sliding mode controllers, respectively. We can see that high
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Fig. 5.9. Total damage across relative attacker power and frequencies calculated for a
platoon using the modified siding mode controller with attack detection. For these results,
disbanding begins when the inter-vehicle separation is increased by two meters.
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Fig. 5.10. Total damage across relative attacker power and frequencies calculated for a
platoon using the modified siding mode controller with attack detection. For these results,
disbanding begins when the inter-vehicle separation is increased by four meters.
damage results in both cases at low frequencies and then reduces greatly as the attack
frequency increases. Furthermore, Fig. 5.8 shows the total damage for the same platoon,
but uses attack detection with the sliding mode controller. Although we still can see high
damage at a certain attack frequency and power, the maximum accumulated damage is
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Fig. 5.11. Total damage across relative attacker power and frequencies calculated for a
platoon using the modified siding mode controller with attack detection. For these results,
disbanding begins when the inter-vehicle separation is increased by seven meters.
lower than that for the two previous cases, which means that adding detection helps with
reducing the number of collisions.
On the other hand, Fig. 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 show the total damage calculated for a
vehicular platoon using the modified mitigation controller. As can be seen, the platoon
disbands when the inter-vehicle separation, for any of the intact vehicles, reaches two, four,
or seven meters with respect to the preceding vehicle. Compared to Fig. 5.8, the results
shown in both Fig. 5.9 and 5.10 show higher total damage, even though the attack detection
is engaged. This is due to the accomplished inter-vehicle separations which deploy once the
disbanding begins, resulting in sudden brakes that can lead to collisions. However, we can
see in Fig. 5.11 that the total damage is reduced when compared with the last two cases. In
fact, the maximum total damage is nearly equivalent to that of the case shown in Fig. 5.8.
The primary difference is that the control of intact vehicles is switched to human drivers,
and, thus, the attacker is no longer able to influence the platoon.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on an existing mitigation controller formulated with the
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goal of reducing the collisions that result by attacking a vehicular platoon. Despite success
in mitigating attack impacts, engaging the aforementioned controller resulted in a platoon
influenced by the attacker. In order to overcome this drawback, we modified the mitigation
controller such that the inter-vehicle separation of the intact vehicles increases gradually.
Then, after reaching a certain threshold, the automation system of the intact vehicles switch
control back to the human driver, hence disbanding the platoon. The last action guarantees
that the attacker becomes unable to control the platoon, and the fewest collisions are
resulting as possible.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we studied the performance of two examples of CPSs while oper-
ating in an environment where security and safety-violating attacks can happen. For each
CPS, we analyzed the harmful impacts that could be generated by specific a attack against
one of the system functionalities. Also, if possible, we suggested potential defenses, with
the goal of reducing attack impacts. The first CPS we studied was a vehicular platoon
wherein we analyzed attacks against the vehicular range and/or range-rate sensors, which
are considered important, as their measurements are utilized by the platooning controller
of each vehicle. For this part, we defined a ”disbanding attack” with impacts can affect a
stream of vehicular platoons, even those which were not specifically attacked. In addition,
two solutions were suggested to handle such an attack. Then, we analyzed the impacts of
FDI attacks against vehicular platoons using reachability analysis. We also considered an
existing mitigation controller that was suggested to handle attacks in which the attacker
controls one of the platooned vehicles. Finally, we studied the HVAC systems which used to
regulate the indoor temperatures of smart buildings. For this part, we formulated an MPC-
based controller to track the desired temperature, and then, assuming the possibility of an
attacker with the capability of manipulating the measurements provided by temperature
sensors in the building, we suggested MTD-based countermeasures to deter the impacts of
such potential attacks. In summary, the following is a list of contributions of each chapter
in this dissertation
• For Chapter 2
– We study the effect of a ”disbanding attack” that involves transition of control of
multiple vehicles in a platoon. We show the harmful impacts such an attack can
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induce, with special focus on how it can cause upstream (non-attacked) platoons
to experience slowdowns and collisions.
– We define the disbanding attack by formulating it as an optimization problem
wherein the objective is to maximize the deviation in vehicles’ speeds, selected as
a proxy for slowdowns and increased chances of colliding, by selecting platoon(s)
to be disbanded and time(s) for disbanding.
– To mitigate the aftermath of such an attack, we formulate an optimal solution
using a Model Predictive Control (MPC) technique. However, as the optimal
approach is not scalable in practice, since it is centralized and both information
and communication-intensive, we also propose a heuristic algorithm to be used
locally by vehicles of intact (non-disbanded) platoons. Our findings indicate
that our algorithm produces nearly equivalent results in terms of reducing speed
changes and avoiding accidents.
– We also demonstrate the validity of the above attack and the suggested heuristic
countermeasures with experiments on a hardware testbed consisting of a motion
capture system and small mobile robots acting as vehicles.
• For Chapter 3
– We analyze the performance of a vehicular platoon undergoing an FDI attack
mounted against one or multiple locally-equipped range and range rate sensors.
– To generalize the problem, we define threat models for targeting either the range
sensors, range-rate sensors, or both. Also, we analyze the resulting impacts from
those attacks.
– After defining both the platoon and threat models, wherein the attack vector
will act as the new control input to the system, we use the optimal control-based
reachability approach to determine the final reachable set by the platoon. This
will show whether collision(s) are possible due to an FDI attack.
• For Chapter 4
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Assuming the presence of potential attacks against HVAC-equipped sensors, the main
contribution of this chapter is to suggest two MTD-based proactive algorithms each
of which determines a random set of installed sensors to be used for two tasks: First,
a partial measurement of the temperatures in some of the building’s zones. Second, a
prediction (estimation) of the temperatures in the remaining zones. To implement the
second task, we will formulate an optimal state observer that relies primarily on the
collected data of inputs and outputs and the randomly-selected sensor set. Achieving
the two aforementioned tasks guarantees the availability of the data (measurements)
required for the operation of the HVAC system. By continuously selecting a random
set at each time step, the attacker’s ability to induce predictable effects by targeting
one or multiple sensors is minimized.
• For Chapter 5
In this chapter, our work builds upon the results presented in a previous study and
also attempts to solve the safety problem in an adversarial environment. The results
shown in that study indicate that the proposed sliding mode controller was able to
considerably eliminate or at the very least, to significantly reduce accidents. But
though the engagement of the proposed controller resulted in a collision-free platoon,
it was still influenced by the attacker-controlled vehicle. For that reason, we modify
the proposed sliding mode controller such that it will still be able to avoid collisions
and at the same time lead the way to disbanding, switching control from auto to
human, of the intact vehicles and, thus, releasing the platoon form the control of the
attacker.
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APPENDIX A
Formulation of the MPC based mitigation approach for Chapter 2
Using MPC technique, the controller of the intact vehicle Vi will determine an acceler-
ation required to alleviate disbanding impacts with respect to preceding vehicle Vi−1. Let
us define the following

e(t)
e˙(t)
e¨(t)
 =

xi(t)− xi−1(t)− d
vi(t)− vi−1(t)
ai(t)− ai−1(t)
 , (A.1)
(d is the desired separation) which can be rewritten in a discrete-time matrix form as

e(k + 1)
e˙(k + 1)
e¨(k + 1)
 =

1 Ts 0
0 1 Ts
0 0 1− Tsτ


e(k)
e˙(k)
e¨(k)
+

0
0
−Ts
τ
ui(k) +

0
0
Ts
τ
ui−1(k), (A.2)
(Ts is the sampling time) which can then be rewritten in a state-space form as
e(k + 1) = Ae(k) +B1ui(k) +B2ui−1(k). (A.3)
Then, the objective is to determine the control sequence that will minimize the following
quadratic cost function
J = eT (N)Y e(N) +
k+N−1∑
k
{eT (k)Qe(k) + uTi (k)Rui(k)}, (A.4)
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subject to the dynamics given in (A.3) and the following state and control constraints
C1e(k) ≤ d (A.5)
C2e(k) ≤ vmax − vi−1(k) (A.6)
C3e(k) ≤ vmin + vi−1(k) (A.7)
umin ≤ ui(k) ≤ umax (A.8)
where
C1 =
[
−1 0 0
]
C2 =
[
0 −1 0
]
C3 =
[
0 1 0
]
State constraints ensures no collisions, (A.5), velocity is within bounds, (A.6) and (A.7),
and resulting commanded acceleration is within bounds too, (A.8). Furthermore, Y , Q,
and R are weighing matrices selected to satisfy the following [? ]
Y = Y T ≥ 0
Q = QT ≥ 0
R = RT > 0
(A.9)
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The predicted error vector e¯ can be written as a function of the current (measured) error
vector e(k) as follows
e¯ = A¯e(k) + B¯1U + B¯2Ui−1 (A.10)
where
e¯ =
[
e(k + 1) . . . e(k +N)
]T
A¯ =
[
A . . . AN
]T
B¯m =

Bm 0 . . . 0
ABm Bm . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
AN−1Bm AN−2Bm . . . Bm

{for m = 1,2}
U =
[
ui(k) . . . , ui(k +N − 1)
]T
Ui−1 =
[
ui−1(k) . . . ui−1(k)
]T
The cost function A.4 can be rewritten in a matrix form as
J = e¯T Q¯e¯+UT R¯U + eT (k)Qe(k) (A.11)
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where
Q¯ =

Q 0 . . . 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
... Q 0
0 0 . . . Y

R¯ =

R 0 . . . 0
0 R . . . 0
...
0 0 . . . R

If (A.10) is substituted into (A.11), then we get
J = 2M1U +U
TM2U , (A.12)
where
M1 = e
T (k)A¯
T
Q¯B¯1 +Ui−1T B¯2
T
Q¯B¯1
M2 = R¯+ B¯1
T
Q¯B¯1
It should be noted that few terms are omitted from (A.12) because they are constant. The
state and control constraints (A.5)-(A.8) can also be rewritten in a matrix form as
Ce(k) ≤W (A.13)
and
U ≤ Umax (A.14)
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−U ≤ −Umin (A.15)
where
C =
[
C1 C2 C3
]T
W =
[
d vmax − vi−1(k) vmin + vi−1(k)
]T
Umax =
[
umax . . . umax
]T
Umin =
[
umin . . . umin
]T
Equation (A.13) can be expressed using the predicted error vector as
C¯e¯ ≤ W¯ (A.16)
where
C¯ =

C 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . C

W¯ =
[
W W . . . W
]T
If (A.10) is substituted into (A.16), we get
C¯B¯1U ≤ W¯ − C¯A¯e(k)− C¯B¯2Ui−1 (A.17)
Equations (A.14), (A.15), and (A.17) can be written in a compact form as
M3U ≤M4 (A.18)
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where
M3 =
[
C¯B¯1 I −I
]T
M4 =
[
W¯ − C¯A¯e(k)− C¯B¯2Ui−1 Umax −Umin
]T
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APPENDIX B
Definitions of Matrices from Chapter 3
A1 =
0(n×n) I(n×n)
0(n×n) 0(n×n)

B1 =

0(n×n)
−1 1 0 . . . 0
0 −1 1 . . . 0
...
0 0 0 . . . −1

A2 =

kp 0 . . . 0 kd 0 . . . 0
−kp kp . . . 0 −kd kd . . . 0
...
0 0 . . . kp 0 0 . . . kd

B2,x =

kp 0 . . . 0
0 kp . . . 0
...
0 0 . . . kp

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B2,v =

kd 0 . . . 0
0 kd . . . 0
...
0 0 . . . kd

B2,xv =
[
B2,x B2,v
]
K1 =
[
A2 A2A . . . A2A
m−1
]T
K2 =

B2 0 . . . 0
A2B B2 . . . 0
...
A2A
m−2B A2Am−3B . . . B2

K3 =
[
k3 k3A . . . k3A
m−1
]T
K4 =

I 0 . . . 0
k3B I . . . 0
...
k3A
m−2B k3Am−3B . . . I

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K5 =
[
k5 k5A . . . k5A
m−1
]T
K6 =

0 0 . . . 0
k5B 0 . . . 0
...
k5A
m−2B k5Am−3B . . . 0

Aineq =
[
I −I K2 −K2 K4 −K4 K6
]T
bineq =
[
δmax − δmin umax −K1e(0) − umin +K1e(0)
smax −K3e(0) − smin +K3e(0) Ψ−K3e(0)
]T
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APPENDIX C
Definitions of Matrices from Chapter 4
Q¯ =

Q 0(n×n) . . . 0(n×n)
0(n×n) Q . . . 0(n×n)
...
...
. . .
...
0(n×n) 0(n×n) . . . Q

R¯ =

R 0(n×n) . . . 0(n×n)
0(n×n) R . . . 0(n×n)
...
...
. . .
...
0(n×n) 0(n×n) . . . R

M1 =
[
I(n×n) I(n×n) . . . I(n×n)
]T
M2 =

A
A2 +A
...
AN +AN−1 + · · ·+A

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M3 =

B 0(n×p) . . . 0(n×p)
AB +B B . . . 0(n×p)
...
...
. . .
...
AN−1B + · · ·+B AN−2B + · · ·+B . . . B

M4 =

G 0(n×n) . . . 0(n×n)
AG+G G . . . 0(n×n)
...
...
. . .
...
AN−1G+ · · ·+G AN−2G+ · · ·+G . . . G

A¯ =
[
CA−N CA−N+1 . . . CA−1
]T
B¯ =

−CA−1B −CA−2B . . . −CA−NB
0(n×p) −CA−1B . . . −CA−N+1B
...
...
. . .
...
0(n×p) 0(n×p) . . . −CA−1B

G¯ =

−CA−1G −CA−2G . . . −CA−NG
0(n×n) −CA−1G . . . −CA−N+1G
...
...
. . .
...
0(n×n) 0(n×n) . . . −CA−1G

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